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            I examine the effects of clients’ expressions of confidence on auditor 
judgments. The confidence heuristic suggests decision makers use expressions of 
confidence as a cue for reliability (Price and Stone 2004). However, Van Swol 
(2009) posits that in some environments decision makers may use expressions of 
confidence as a cue for deception.  The auditing environment provides a unique 
setting to examine this assertion because the auditing standards prescribe that 
auditors should maintain a skeptical mindset. One interpretation of the auditing 
standards suggests auditors’ responses to expressions of confidence may be 
dependent on cues from the control and business environment. When a client has a 
weaker control and business environment, auditors may use expressed confidence as 
a cue for deception. When a client has a stronger control and business environment, 
auditors may use expressed confidence as a cue for reliability. I use an experiment to 
test these hypotheses.  Results indicate that auditors do not use expressed confidence 
in their decision making when the client has a stronger control and business 
environment. In contrast, results indicate that auditors use the confidence heuristic 
when the client has a weaker control and business environment. The results provide 
new theoretical insights into decision makers’ use of expressed confidence that 









CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to understand the effects of clients’ expressions of 
confidence on auditor judgments.  The psychology literature defines confidence as 
the strength of a person’s belief about the quality or accuracy of a statement, opinion, 
or choice (Peterson and Pitz 1988). Using the expressed level of confidence as a cue 
for the accuracy or reliability of the information relayed or the competenc or 
knowledge of the source of information is called the confidence heuristic (Price and 
Stone 2004). 
 If auditors use the confidence heuristic, clients’ expressed confidence impacts 
auditor judgments. Auditors rely on management explanations throughout the audit, 
from the planning to the substantive testing phase. Auditors evaluate managemet 
explanations based on cues regarding client competence and motives found in the 
control and business environment.  Often, auditors are faced with clients expressing 
confidence in the explanations they provide to the auditors.  However, auditors must 
determine that management explanations are reliable before using them. Some 
studies suggest auditors over-rely on management explanations (i.e., Trompeter and 
Wright 2010; Messier et al. 2010).  Auditor over-reliance on management 
explanations can be costly to the auditor because PCAOB (Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board) inspections with negative results may occur.  One 
possible reason auditors over-rely on management explanations is that auditors use 
client characteristics, such as client confidence, as a cue for reliability.  In this study, 
I experimentally investigate how clients’ expressions of confidence influence 





auditors react to clients’ expressions of confidence when they observe cues rgarding 
client competence and cues from the control and business environment.   
I use (1) findings from the psychology literature regarding the confidence 
heuristic and (2) the auditing standards to develop competing hypotheses regarding 
how auditors are likely to respond to client expressions of confidence. Specifically, 
the confidence heuristic, a psychology-based theory, suggests that when clients 
express confidence, auditors will interpret this as a cue for knowledge or reliability.  
That is, auditors are more likely to rely on client-provided information when the 
client provides the information with an expression of confidence. In contrast, the 
auditing standards require auditors to have a skeptical mindset. Auditing researchrs 
have developed two interpretations of skepticism based on wording in the auditing 
standards (Nelson 2009).1 One interpretation of the auditing standards suggests that 
auditors will use expressed confidence as a cue for deception, consistent with Van 
Swol (2009) who posits that when people are suspicious, they will use expressed 
confidence as a cue for deception instead of reliability. The other interpretation of 
skepticism suggests the auditors’ response to expressed confidence will be based on 
cues from the control and business environment. When the cues are indicative of a 
weak control and business environment, the skeptical auditor will use expressed 
confidence as a cue for deception because the client’s expressed confidence will be 
inconsistent with the entity’s information environment. In contrast, when the cues are 
indicative of a strong control and business environment, the auditor will use 
expressed confidence as a cue for reliability. Thus, the confidence heuristic and 
                                                          





auditing standards suggest differing effects for client expressions of confidence on 
auditor judgments, and I provide an experimental test of these predictions.  
Furthermore, I compare auditors’ behavior in the auditing task to their 
behavior in a non-audit task studied in prior psychology literature to determine 
whether auditors behave like the decision makers in psychology studies when 
engaging in a non-audit task. I also examine the auditor’s own trait skepticism o 
determine whether it is the trait skepticism or the decision context that explains the 
auditors’ reactions in the non-audit task.  
I find that participants (auditors) assuming the role of an auditor performing 
inquiry for an inventory valuation task rely on the auditing environment to determine 
if they will use expressed confidence in their decision making. Specifically, when the 
client has a strong control and business environment, auditors do not use the client’s 
expressed confidence in their decision making. Instead, auditors rely on cues from 
the control and business environment. In contrast, when the client has a weak control 
and business environment, auditors use the confidence heuristic. These results 
suggest a couple of potential explanations. One potential reason for this effect may 
be that auditors found the weak control environment to be associated with 
information uncertainty (Beneish et al. 2008). As a result, auditors were motivated to 
reduce uncertainty by relying on the controller expressing confidence (Loewenstein 
1994). Secondly, auditors may have experienced high cognitive load under the weak 
control environment condition. When people experience high cognitive load, they 
are more likely to use heuristics. Auditors may have experienced high cognitive load 





that suggested risk required increased processing. Both of these explanations provide 
opportunities for further research in this area. Furthermore, I find that in the non-
audit task, auditors do not use the expressed confidence in their decision making. 
Overall, the results indicate that auditors only rely on expressed confidence in riskier 
environments, perhaps because they cannot rely on cues from the environment.  
This study contributes to both the accounting and psychology literatures. 
First, this study extends the auditing literature by examining another client 
characteristic that auditors use as a cue for information reliability. However, 
expressed confidence, unlike other previously studied client characteristics, can have 
multiple interpretations, i.e., as a cue for knowledge or reliability or as a cue for 
deception. Prior auditing literature has examined client characteristics having only 
one interpretation, while my study examines a characteristic which entails two 
possible interpretations. Furthermore, this study is the first to examine the use of 
client characteristics to determine information reliability in a post-SOX environment. 
The significance of the current regulatory environment is that auditors are 
increasingly aware of their responsibility to the public and as a result perform the 
audit with increased scrutiny.  
Second, I extend the psychology literature by identifying a setting in which 
expressed confidence may naturally be interpreted as deception, rather th n 
knowledge or reliability, without any priming or warning by the experimenter. 
Psychology research posits that people may use confidence deceptively to 
manipulate decision makers (Sniezek and Buckley 1995). Van Swol (2009) followed 





expressing confidence. However, the participants in his study did not respond by 
using confidence as a cue for deception.  The audit context provides a rich setting in 
which to build upon this psychology theory because the auditing standards require 
auditors to act skeptically when performing an audit (i.e., they do not have to be 
primed to act in this manner).  Therefore, this study makes a contribution to the 
psychology literature by showing that expressed confidence is not interpreted as 
deception in the auditing context where a skeptical mindset is the norm. 
Finally, my study has important implications for audit firms and regulators.  
My study investigates a reason for the over-reliance on client explanations 
documented by the PCAOB (PCAOB 2008). Over-reliance on clients has 
implications for audit quality. Audit firms and regulators can inform auditors of the 
risks of such reliance and provide auditors with cues for identifying deception so that 
auditors will be more effective in catching deception. Additionally, accounting 
scholars will have a better understanding of the reason for research findings which 
indicate auditors over-rely on client explanations (Trompeter and Wright 2010; 
Messier et al. 2010) 
In the following chapter, I examine relevant research to support my 
competing hypotheses. Chapter three describes the experiment, chapter four provides 
results, and in chapter five I draw conclusions from the research findings.  
CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
     In the following section, I review literature related to the auditor’s use of 
management inquiry. I also examine prior literature regarding the control a d 





and skepticism. I rely on theory and findings from the psychology and auditing 
literatures to develop my research hypotheses. 
Use of Management Inquiry in Auditing 
 
Audit evidence is any information the auditor uses to make a conclusion 
regarding the fairness of the financial statements of an entity. Evidence can be 
tangible (e.g., documents) or intangible (e.g., attitudes of management indicating 
aggressiveness). Regulators set standards emphasizing that evidence should only be 
used if auditors determine the evidence is reliable (SAS 31; SAS 106). The third 
standard of fieldwork states that auditors can obtain reliable evidence through 
inspection, observation, inquiry, or confirmation (AU 150). The reliability of 
evidence is based on the following principles: independent sources are more reliable 
than sources within the entity, strong internal controls increase the reliability of 
information found within the organization, and first hand evidence is more reliable 
than second hand evidence. For example, documentation provided by a third party is 
more reliable than management representations or explanations. This standard 
suggests that auditors should determine that management is reliable before 
considering management explanations as reliable. However, the standards do not 
indicate how auditors should determine the reliability of information provided by 
management.  
Management inquiry is one form of evidence often used by auditors in both 
audits and reviews of financial statements. Since information asymmetry exists 
between the client and the auditor, management inquiry can be a useful source of 





However, clients also have incentives to provide evidence that will only reflect 
positively on the entity. Therefore, auditors must consider the reliability of client-
provided information when deciding whether to rely on client explanations.  During 
reviews, auditors are not required to perform any testing beyond client inquiry and 
analytical review. In contrast, during an audit, auditors are required to corroborate 
client explanations. However, some studies suggest that auditors over-rely on client 
explanations and fail to corroborate management’s explanations with other evidenc 
during an audit (Trompeter and Wright 2010; Messier et al. 2010).  
Several studies examine the auditor’s consideration of client characteristi s 
(integrity, competence, and objectivity) when evaluating client-provided 
explanations. Overall, these studies indicate that auditors use characteristics of 
management as cues to determine the reliability of the client-provided information.  
Hirst (1994) examines how auditors react to client competence and objectivity when 
determining the reliability of the client. Hirst (1994) finds that auditors increase their 
reliance on management when the client is more competent. Additionally, auditors 
rely on evidence provided by other auditors more than evidence provided by the 
client because auditors consider management less objective than other auditors (Hirst 
1994). Peecher (1996) examines another client characteristic, client integrity, finding 
that auditors are sensitive to differences in client integrity. Haynes (1999) examines 
whether auditors are more sensitive to the source reliability or to the informativeness 
of the evidence when determining evidence reliability. Haynes’ results indicate that 
auditors weigh client characteristics that signal reliability more than the actual 





auditors perceive client-provided evidence to be more reliable when the client has 
high integrity, high competence, and high objectivity.  These characteristics can be 
viewed as cues for reliability. Therefore, these studies indicate that auditors evaluate 
client reliability, and this evaluation affects their reliance on client explanations. I 
argue that auditors use expressed confidence as another cue to determine the 
reliability of client-provided information. Additionally, auditors’ interpretations of 
clients’ expressions of confidence may be dependent on cues from the control and 
business environment.  In the next section, I review literature related to the control
and business environment.  
Control and Business Environment  
Auditors may interpret management responses differently depending on cues 
from the control and business environment. Auditors must consider both factors 
when making judgments during the audit. First, I will discuss the control 
environment.    
Control Environment 
The control environment informs the auditor regarding client competence, 
client motives, and client opportunities.  Auditors assess the control environment 
when conducting the audit because the control environment is a determinant of the 
reliability of the financial reporting process, and a weak control environment can be 
indicative of a riskier auditing environment (SOX 2002). This is because a lack of 
competence, the presence of motives to deceive, and the presence of opportunities to 





environment when planning the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures 
required for the audit (SAS 109). 
The control environment has seven components: (1) integrity and ethical 
values, (2) commitment to competence, (3) board of directors and audit committee, 
(4) management philosophy and operating style, (5) organizational structure, (6) 
assignment of authority and responsibility, and (7) human resources policies and 
procedures (COSO 1992).  The Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) suggests strong 
control environments have two important characteristics: independent, 
knowledgeable boards of directors and audit committees and a tone at the top that 
emphasizes an ethical culture and the importance of fraud risk management (CAQ 
2010). Senior management should notify all levels throughout the organization about 
the tone at the top, and the actions of senior management should demonstrate this 
tone at the top.  The tone at the top suggests to outside parties that the culture of the 
company is to take appropriate actions; therefore, management has fewer motiv s to 
deceive outside parties. The board of directors and audit committee support the tone 
at the top by selecting the appropriate management team and providing oversight of 
the financial reporting process by monitoring risks including fraud.  With such 
mechanisms in place, management is more accountable for their actions and is less 
likely to engage in aggressive or inappropriate behavior because fewer opportunities 
to do so are present (CAQ 2010). Therefore, management has less opportunity (due 
to the presence of the audit committee) and less motive (due to the presence of an 
appropriate tone at the top) to deceive outside parties.  Not only do the standards 





directors, but accounting studies have examined auditors’ consideration of these 
elements of the control environment in performing the audit as well. For example, 
Cohen and Hanno (2000) find that auditors consider the strength of the control 
environment in planning judgments because a weak control environment is an 
indicator of risk. 
In addition to the above factors, I consider the commitment to competence as 
an important factor of the control environment because it impacts auditors’ 
assessments of source reliability (the perception that a message source will provide 
accurate information). If firms’ management teams have a high commitment o 
competence, then this suggests they hire employees with appropriate skill sets and 
train the employees regularly. Therefore, auditors will be more likely to rely on these 
more credible sources. 
 Additionally, the following studies generally indicate that auditors are 
sensitive to competence which is used as a proxy for source reliability. Bamber 
(1983) suggests the expertise of other audit team members influences auditor 
judgments. Rebele et al. (1988) find that auditors increase their reliance on 
management estimates when the client is more competent rather than less competent 
during substantive analytical procedures.  Anderson et al. (1994) examine client 
competence in a preliminary analytical procedures task, finding that auditors rely 
more on results from client inquiry when client competence is higher rather than 
lower. Furthermore, Hirst (1994) examines auditor sensitivity to client competence 
during preliminary analytical procedures.  Hirst examines evidence objectivity (a 





(higher or lower competence), finding that auditors rely on the more competent and 
more objective evidence source. These studies recognize that auditors examine the 
competence of the source when evaluating the information provided by the source. 
Therefore, it is important to recognize that the control and business environment will 
provide a cue for source reliability. If auditors do not consider the reliability of the 
source, they may under-rely or over-rely on the client explanation.  
Overall, these studies indicate that auditors consider control environment 
strength when auditing an entity. A commitment to competence (i.e., source 
reliability) increases the probability that the information source and information 
provided are accurate. However, competence is not a guarantee of accuracy; 
therefore, auditors should also consider other cues from the control environment 
such as motives to deceive (i.e., tone at the top), and opportunities to deceive (i.e., 
audit committee strength). Next, I will discuss the business environment.  
Business Environment 
            Auditors may interpret management responses during inquiry differently 
depending on cues from the business environment.  The business environment 
informs the auditor regarding conditions that affect organizational operations.  
Auditors assess the business environment when conducting the audit because the 
business environment is a determinant of the reliability of the financial reporting 
process, and signals from the business environment can be indicative of a riskier 
auditing environment. Such cues include management concerns with earnings trends, 
analysts’ consensus forecasts, incentive compensation plans, compliance with loan 





planning an audit. For example, Anderson et al. (2004) examine the specific risk of 
management incentives to manage earnings. Anderson et al. (2004) examine 
auditors’ perceptions of management explanations for differences in the revenue 
accounts when the explanation is consistent or inconsistent with management 
incentives. They find that auditors perceive management explanations as less 
persuasive when the explanation is consistent with management’s incentive to 
manage earnings. Therefore, it is important to recognize that the business 
environment will provide cues as to whether management incentives are present.  In 
the next section, I examine two possible ways in which auditors may interpret 
confidence. 
Interpretations of Expressions of Confidence 
As discussed above, prior accounting research has examined the effect of 
several client characteristics on auditor judgments. I posit that a client’s expressions 
of confidence may be another cue auditors use to evaluate client-provided 
information’s reliability. However, unlike cues examined by prior accounting 
literature, expressed confidence may be subject to dual interpretations (as reliability 
or as deception). I develop my competing hypotheses regarding auditors’ 
interpretations of clients’ expressions of confidence in the following sections.  
Confidence Heuristic - The Role of Confidence in Decision Making 
Several studies in psychology examine the impact of expressed confidence on 
decision making. Research on expressed confidence has been conducted in 
eyewitness settings, judge-advisor settings, and group settings. Leippe et al. (1992) 





believable and more accurate. In the judge-advisor setting, studies find that the 
advisors’ expressed confidence causes people to think that the advisor has higher 
levels of knowledge, and therefore, people are more likely to accept advice provided 
by the advisor (Price and Stone 2004; Sniezek and Buckley 1995; Sniezek and Van 
Swol, 2001; Van Swol and Sniezek 2005). In the group setting, researchers find that 
those group members and supervisors who expressed higher confidence had greater 
influence on other group members and subordinates (Zarnoth and Sniezek 1997). 
Sniezek and Van Swol (2001) suggest a reason for these findings. When other 
information regarding the source is unavailable and information asymmetry exists
between two parties, decision makers may use expressed confidence as a cue for 
reliability (Sniezek and Van Swol 2001); this is called the confidence heuristic. 
Penrod and Cutler (1995) provide evidence that decision makers use expressed 
confidence as a cue for accuracy, reliability, competence, or knowledge.   
Consistent with prior psychology literature, I define confidence as the 
strength of a person’s belief about the quality or accuracy of a statement, opinion, or 
choice (Peterson and Pitz 1988). I focus on expressions of confidence, and in this 
study, an expression of confidence is defined as a statement suggesting certaity or 
correctness (Penrod and Cutler 1995). Examples of expressions of confidence 
include “I know it's…” and “I'm absolutely certain it's…” (Wesson and Pulford 
2009).2 Using this expressed level of confidence as a cue for the accuracy or 
reliability of the information relayed or the competence or knowledge of the source 
of information is called the confidence heuristic (Price and Stone 2004). Sniezek and 
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Van Swol (2001) suggest the confidence heuristic is likely developed over time 
because in communicating beliefs, people express levels of confidence in proportion 
to their level of certainty in those beliefs. Consequently, people learn to use 
expressed confidence to evaluate the reliability of information provided by a source 
(Thomas and McFayden 1995). Therefore, people perceive and judge information as 
more reliable if the information is expressed confidently rather than with doubt or 
uncertainty.  Like other heuristics, the confidence heuristic can be considered a short 
cut or decision tool used to arrive at a decision and may lead to systematic errors. 
Decision makers use heuristics when under time pressure, when experiencing 
information overload, or when little information is available on which to base 
judgments (Kahneman et al. 1982).  
The use of the confidence heuristic may be observed in auditing. In the 
auditing environment, auditors cannot always independently validate client-provided 
information. Because of this, the auditor cannot fully evaluate the reliability of 
client-provided information, and the auditor will rely on other cues to determine 
information reliability. If the auditor observes indicators of client competence, the 
auditor may assume that the client can evaluate her own knowledge. This could lead 
to auditors using clients’ expressions of confidence as a cue for reliability, consistent 
with findings in the psychology literature (Price and Stone 2004; Thomas and 
McFadyen 1995; Zarnoth and Sniezek 1997).  
In summary, the psychology literature suggests that decision makers use 
characteristics of a person, such as her expressed confidence, to judge the accuracy 





suggests auditors rely on client characteristics to determine reliability of client 
explanations. These research streams together suggest that the confidence expressed 
by a client may lead auditors to rely on the client-provided information, such that the 
auditor will rely more on the client when the client expresses confidence. Thus, this 
suggests the following hypothesis (see Figure 1): 
 
H1(Confidence Heuristic Prediction): Auditors will use client expressions of confidence 
as a cue for reliability. 
 
 While auditing research reviewed in a prior section indicates that cues from 
the control and business environment may affect the auditors’ decision making, the 
psychology literature suggests the confidence heuristic holds in all decision making 
environments. Therefore, according to research in psychology, the confidence 
heuristic will have the same predicted (positive) effects regardless of control and 
business environment strength. Interestingly, some auditing standards also suggest a 
consistent (but negative) effect of clients’ expressions of confidence. I explor  this in 
the next section. In a later section, I will revisit the potential effect of the control and 
business environment on the auditors’ use of the client’s expressed confidence. 
As indicated in the prior section, the confidence heuristic from the 
psychology literature suggests that auditors may use client confidence as a cue for 
the reliability of client-provided information, causing the auditor to rely more on the 
client explanation when the client provides an explanation with an expression of 
confidence. In this section, I discuss an alternative and contrasting possible effect of 





auditors could interpret explanations from clients expressing confidence as more 
suspicious or deceptive, an idea considered by one study in the communication 
literature. Van Swol (2009) indicates advisors with a motive to persuade try to 
benefit from advice seekers’ use of the confidence heuristic by deceptively 
increasing their expressed confidence to hide any uncertainty when providing their 
advice. However, in Van Swol’s experiment, advice seekers were not able to 
recognize this deception even when instructed to be suspicious.  Instead, advice 
seekers perceived the advisor with the motive to be persuasive to be more 
knowledgeable and confident when the advice was offered with an expression of 
confidence. Advice seekers also used the advice of the advisor with the motive to be 
persuasive. 
Consistent with Van Swol (2009), audit clients may also have a persuasion 
motive and may deceptively express confidence to convince auditors of a benign 
reason for an unexpected account fluctuation.  This idea is based on Interpersonal 
Deception Theory, a theory that examines how deception and deception detection 
occur in communication, which suggests that when people have a deception motive, 
they attempt to hide their uncertainties (Buller and Burgoon 1996).  This is because 
deception involves hiding information or avoiding discussing information (Buller 
and Burgoon 1996). However, in contrast to Van Swol’s findings in a non-audit 
context, this persuasion strategy may not be successful in the audit context due to 
differences between this context and those studied in the psychology and 
communication literatures. Specifically, auditors do not assume their interactions 





truthful as is typical for people in many other decision making environments (Bond 
and DePaulo 2006). Instead, auditors are required to act skeptically and may, 
therefore, interpret expressed confidence as a cue for deception.3 In the next section, 
I explore two views of professional skepticism based on (1) auditing researchers’ 
interpretations of the auditing standards (2) specific wording presented in the 
auditing standards.     
Researchers’ Interpretations of Professional Skepticism in the Auditing Standards  
Many auditing standards emphasize that auditors should act in a skeptical 
manner. These standards include SAS No. 57, SAS No. 99, and AU 316 among 
others. The standards define skepticism as having a questioning mind and critically 
assessing evidence.  The standards emphasize skepticism because standard setters 
suggest that auditors will perform a more effective audit when maintaining an 
attitude of skepticism.  
 Auditing researchers have developed two views (interpretations) of 
skepticism based on wording in the auditing standards: the presumptive doubt view 
and the neutral view. Nelson (2009) describes the presumptive doubt view as 
suggesting that “auditor behavior indicates relatively more doubt about the validity 
of some assertion.” Additionally, Bell et al. (2005) describes the presumptive doubt 
view as “assuming some level of dishonesty.” In contrast, Nelson (2009) describes 
the neutral view as suggesting the “auditor does not assume any bias ex ante.” 
Furthermore, Hurtt (2010) describes the neutral view as “the propensity of the 
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individual to defer concluding until the evidence provides sufficient support for one 
alternative over others.” I will examine the presumptive doubt view first and 
examine the neutral view in a later section regarding auditor sensitivity to the audit 
situation and trait skepticism. 
Presumptive Doubt View of Professional Skepticism in the Auditing Standards 
Nelson (2009) and Bell et al. (2005) developed the presumptive doubt view 
(interpretation) of skepticism using wording present in auditing standards such as 
SAS No. 57, SAS No. 99, and AU 316. Specifically, the wording in SAS No. 57 
(regarding accounting estimates) suggests that because accounting estimates are 
subjective in nature, the auditor should consider that management may be biased in 
making the estimates, and therefore, the auditor should act skeptically. Similarly, the 
wording in SAS No. 99 suggests that due to the nature of fraud, the auditor should 
maintain a mindset that a material misstatement due to fraud is possible despitany 
prior experiences with the client and despite any impressions the auditor has 
regarding a client’s honesty. Hence, the auditor should always assume that a risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud is a possibility. The wording in AU 316 also 
suggests that the auditor should assume a risk of fraud exists in the revenue accounts 
and respond to this risk by increasing audit procedures and using more unpredictable 
audit procedures.  These standards indicate a move towards the presumptive doubt 
view (Bell et. al 2005). An increased move towards this presumptive doubt view is 
likely due to regulators blaming a lack of professional skepticism for many audit 
failures (PCAOB 2008).    





As discussed in the prior section, the presumptive doubt view suggests that 
the auditor should assume that a discrepancy may exist in the financial statements.  
This view suggests auditors will require higher quantity and quality evidence to 
determine whether management has depicted the financial state of the entity 
accurately.  For example, McMillan and White (1993) indicate that when auditors 
assume a discrepancy is present in the financial statements, they are more sensitive 
to evidence than when auditors examine the financial statements with a neutral
attitude. 
In summary, the presumptive doubt view of skepticism requires auditors to 
maintain an attitude of skepticism.  Therefore, I expect that in an auditing 
environment, where auditors are required to act according to standards, auditors will 
not use the confidence heuristic. Instead, the auditors’ skepticism will lead the 
auditor to use expressions of confidence as a cue for deception consistent with the 
ideas of Van Swol (2009).  Thus, the presumptive doubt view of skepticism suggests 
the following (see Figure 1): 
 
H2(Presumptive Doubt View of Skepticism): Auditors will use expressions of confidence 
as a cue for deception. 
 
 
The above presumptive doubt view of skepticism prediction (H2) suggests 
auditors will be skeptical in all auditing environments due to the requirements of the 
auditing standards.  Consistent with this view, some studies show that audit firms 
have policies and procedures that require a baseline level of skepticism that must be 





increase the extent to which auditors trust clients. Although they find that 
management’s willingness to communicate and management’s demonstration of 
concern during discussions increases auditors’ trust in their clients, the authors note 
that firm policies and procedures prevent auditors from decreasing their skepticism 
despite the presence of these management characteristics. Therefore, Renni  et al. 
(2010) support the idea outlined in H2 that auditors will be skeptical when 
interpreting management expressions of confidence.  
While I suggest the presumptive doubt view will lead the auditor to interpret 
expressed confidence as deception, another possibility is that the presumptive doubt 
view may lead the auditor to ignore expressed confidence and instead, treat all
management communications as potentially deceptive. However, this seems unlikely
for several reasons. (1) The psychology literature indicates that during strategic 
interactions in which conflicts of interest are present, people fail to ignore cues or 
discount cues from biased information providers (Wilson and Brekke 1994).  (2) The 
curse of knowledge theory suggests people’s decision making is influenced by 
information they should ignore (Camerer et al. 1989). (3) When people try to 
decrease the impact of information they should not use, this attempt can lead to 
increased use of the information (Wegner 1994).Therefore, although the presumptive 
doubt view may suggest that auditors should ignore expressed confidence altogether, 
auditors may not do so. Instead, considering the presumptive doubt view in light of 
prior psychology research, suggests the negative effect of expressed confidence 





In a prior section, I reviewed literature suggesting auditor decision making is 
dependent on cues from the control and business environment. This idea is consistent 
with the neutral view of professional skepticism and research that suggests that 
auditor skepticism varies according to audit circumstances such as variation in the 
strength of the control and business environment. I examine this possibility in the 
following section. Specifically, I will discuss the neutral view of professional 
skepticism and the auditors’ skepticism in response to the audit situation. In a later 
section, I will examine the impact of the auditor’s trait skepticism.  
Neutral View of Skepticism in the Auditing Standards  
Nelson (2009) and Hurtt (2010) developed the neutral view (interpretation) of 
skepticism based on wording present in many auditing standards such as SAS 99 and 
AU 330; this view suggests that auditors’ skepticism is dependent on cues from their 
environment. For example, auditors should begin the audit without bias and exercise 
increased skepticism in riskier situations, i.e., the auditors’ level of skepticism should 
be a result of the audit situation. Standards adopting the neutral view include SAS 99 
which states auditors should be aware of circumstances that indicate a higher level of 
fraud risk and exercise a greater degree of skepticism in such situations. 
Additionally, AU 330 addresses confirmations and suggests auditors exercis greater 
degrees of skepticism in specific circumstances that are of greater isk. These 
standards suggest auditors will act differently in varying audit situations.  In the next 
section, I examine research on the neutral view of professional skepticism and the 
situations that may require increased skepticism.  





 Research in auditing indicates that auditors act with increased skepticism in 
riskier situations, consistent with the neutral view of skepticism. For example, 
Anderson et al. (2004) examine the specific risk of management incentives to 
manage earnings. Anderson et al. (2004) examine auditors’ perceptions of 
management explanations for differences in the revenue accounts when the 
explanation is consistent or inconsistent with management incentives. They find that 
auditors perceive management explanations as less persuasive when the explanation 
is consistent with management’s incentive to manage earnings. Therefore, auditors 
exercise increased skepticism when faced with a risk factor such as manageme t 
incentives to manage earnings. Similarly, Shaub and Lawrence (1996) find that 
auditors respond to the following risky situations with increased skepticism: related 
party transactions, financial difficulty of the client, client inaccuracies discovered in 
prior years, and poor communication between the auditor and the client.   
In addition, research in auditing has examined the interaction of the auditor’s 
own level of trait skepticism (discussed further in the next section) and situations that 
bring about increased skeptical behaviors. Hurtt et al. (2008) find a relation between 
trait skepticism and skeptical actions induced by situational factors. They find that 
auditors who have a higher level of trait skepticism respond to situations requiring 
greater skepticism (i.e., situations with greater risk) with more skeptical actions (the 
extent of audit evidence search and generation of alternate explanations) than do
auditors who have a lower level of trait skepticism. Similar to Hurtt et al. (2008), 
Quadackers et al. (2009) examine trait skepticism using three personality factors 





situations that induce skepticism. They find that a weak control environment is a 
situation which induces skepticism. Auditors with higher levels of personality factors 
indicative of skepticism react to skepticism-inducing situations with a greater 
amount of skeptical actions such as increasing the number of budgeted hours to 
complete the audit.   
The research reviewed above suggests the auditor’s interpretation of 
expressed confidence may be dependent on the situational factors present in the 
auditor’s working environment because the situational factors may trigger a higher or 
lower level of skepticism. This is consistent with the neutral view of skepticism. 
Similar to Quadackers et al. (2009) and Anderson et al. (2004), I examine the impact 
of the control environment and the business environment. The accounting research 
reviewed above indicates auditors behave in a skeptical manner and act in an even 
more skeptical manner in riskier situations, such as a when an entity has a we k
control environment and when certain incentives are present in the business 
environment (Quadackers et al. 2009; Anderson et al. 2004). Therefore, I expect the 
control and business environment to influence the amount of skeptical actions taken 
by the auditor (i.e., amount of additional evidence obtained) and the auditor’s 
reaction to expressions of confidence. Specifically, I expect clients’ xpressed 
confidence to be interpreted in two different ways, depending on the control and 
business environment. I expect that when the entity has a weak control and business 
environment, auditors will act with increased skepticism and will not use the 
confidence heuristic. Instead, auditors will interpret expressed confidence as 





because the client’s expressed confidence will be inconsistent with the information 
provided by the audit situation. When auditors are skeptical, they are more aware of 
inconsistencies because they do not accept explanations at face value. Furthermore, 
the weak control and business environment will be indicative of a lower commitment 
to competence, a weaker tone at the top, a less effective audit committee, and a 
presence of incentives to meet analysts’ consensus forecasts. These cues suggest the 
client has low source reliability and that the client has opportunities and motivations 
to deceive outside parties, further causing the auditor to be skeptical of clients’ 
expressions of confidence.  As a result, the client’s expression of confidence will 
lead the auditor to believe that the client is trying to hide a discrepancy in the 
financial statements, and this belief will increase the likelihood that the auditor will 
not rely on the client explanation. Conversely, when the entity has a strong control
and business environment, auditors will act with decreased skepticism and will use 
the confidence heuristic. Therefore, the auditor will take expressed confidence as a 
cue for reliability. Specifically, the strong control and business environment will be 
indicative of a higher commitment to competence, a stronger tone at the top, a more 
effective audit committee, and the absence of incentives to meet analysts’ con ensus 
forecasts. Hence, the auditor will find the client to be credible and have fewer 
opportunities and motives to deceive the auditor (see Figure 2). Stated formally, I 
hypothesize the following:  
H3 (Neutral View of Skepticism): When a client has a weaker control and business 
environment, auditors will use expressions of confidence as a cue for 
deception. When a client has a stronger control and business environment, 






While the neutral view of skepticism predicts results consistent with H3, 
prior literature provides some uncertainty regarding the prediction.  Specifically, 
Karmarkar and Tormala (2010) examine expressions of confidence in a context in 
which additional information regarding the information source is available. They 
find that the expressed confidence is only used as a cue for information reliability 
when there is an inconsistency between the expression of confidence and 
characteristics of the information source, such as expertise. The authors suggest this 
occurs because people are surprised by the non-expert’s expression of confidence, 
leading to more information processing and, consequently, a greater effect of the 
confidently expressed information. Similarly, in my study, I provide additional 
information regarding the client, and the client has a persuasion motive.  In contrast 
to participants in the Karmarkar and Tormala study, auditors are aware of th  
possibility of deception, and the auditing standards require that auditors exercis  
skepticism. If my study follows the pattern of results suggested by Karmarkar and 
Tormala (2010), then the inconsistency between the weak control and business 
environment and the expression of confidence would lead the auditor to rely more on 
the client explanation when there is an expression of confidence in a weak control
and business environment. Likewise, the inconsistency between the strong control 
and business environment and the expression of no confidence would lead the 
auditor to rely more on the client when the client has a strong control and business 
environment and the expression of no confidence is present.  This relationship is the 
opposite of H3’s prediction.  This additional potential pattern of results adds tension 





Comparing Auditors’ Behavior to Others  
In the prior section, I suggest that the auditor’s reaction to expressions of 
confidence may be dependent on the context of the audit task. In this section, I 
extend the idea that the auditor’s interpretation of expressed confidence may be 
dependent on the audit task context (e.g., the strength of the control and business 
environment) by exploring the idea that the auditor’s behavior may be dependent on 
context in general. Specifically, I examine auditors’ behavior in a non-audit context 
that has been examined by the psychology literature, a restaurant review cont xt.  I 
test whether auditors use expressed confidence as a cue for reliability or deception in 
an everyday task which allows me to determine whether skeptical behavior is 
brought on by the environment or is due to a trait of the auditor (discussed below). 
That is, auditors may have some level of skepticism as part of their personality that is 
separate from any skeptical behavior brought on by the auditing standards or audit
situation.  
I compare the auditor’s reaction to expressions of confidence in a non-audit 
task and the auditor’s reaction to expressions of confidence in an audit task. As 
depicted in Figure 3, if auditors do not use the confidence heuristic in the auditing 
task but do use the confidence heuristic in the non-audit task, then I will conclude 
that the environment determines whether or not the confidence heuristic is used (i.e., 
auditors behave according to the auditing standards only when performing audits).  
Conversely, if auditors do not use the confidence heuristic in either environment, 
then I will conclude that auditors possess a trait that causes them to react diff rently 





trait skepticism determines the auditor’s reaction to expressions of confidence.4 To 
determine which situation applies to auditor judgments, I investigate the following 
research question: 
 
 RQ1a: Will auditors use the confidence heuristic in a non-audit task?
 
Hurtt et al. (2008) indicate auditors have varying levels of trait skepticism. 
Hurtt (2010) develops a scale to measure trait levels of skepticism. The scale is b sed 
on characteristics identified in “auditing standards, psychology, philosophy, and 
consumer behavior research” (Hurtt 2010). Those with higher levels of skepticism, 
as indicated by the scale, automatically view various situations with more doubt.
Therefore, auditors may vary in their reaction to expressed confidence in a non-audit 
task (see Figure 3). To measure the auditor’s own level of trait skepticism, I use the 
Hurtt scale.  If an auditor has a relatively high level of trait skepticism, I expect that 
the auditor will be skeptical in the non-audit task and will not act according to the 
predictions of the confidence heuristic.  In contrast, some auditors may have 
relatively lower levels of trait skepticism than other auditors. If an auditor has a 
relatively low level of trait skepticism, I expect that this auditor will behave 
consistently with the findings of the psychology literature (i.e., this auditor w ll use 
the confidence heuristic). This leads me to the following research question: 
                                                          
4 The trait skepticism can be due to a trait that has been learned from the auditing environment. As a 
result of learning and adopting this trait, auditors apply it in all environments. Alternatively, this trait 
skepticism may be purely a personality trait that is prevalent in people who join the auditing 






RQ1b: Will the auditor’s reaction to expressions of confidence in a non-audit 




In summary, I present the confidence heuristic view and two auditing 
standards views as competing hypotheses regarding auditors’ reactions to 
expressions of confidence. The confidence heuristic literature predicts that auditors 
will use the confidence heuristic. This will lead auditors to use clients’ expressions 
of confidence as an indicator of client reliability. Therefore, auditors will rely more 
on the client explanation and collect less additional evidence when interacting with 
clients expressing confidence (H1). The presumptive doubt view of professional 
skepticism suggests another possibility. These standards require auditors to assume  
discrepancy exists and to be skeptical. Therefore, auditors will not use the 
confidence heuristic but will instead use expressed confidence as a cue for deception 
(H2). Other auditing standards emphasizing the neutral view of professional 
skepticism require auditors to be more skeptical in response to risks and problems in 
their environment. Consequently, auditors may view clients’ expressions of 
confidence as a deception technique only in riskier situations such as when the 
auditor observes cues indicating the entity has a weak control and business 
environment. Therefore, auditors will decrease their reliance on the client 
explanation and collect additional evidence when interacting with clients expressing 
confidence in a weak control and business environment (H3).  In contrast, when the 





heuristic and increase their reliance on the client explanation and not collect
additional evidence when interacting with clients expressing confidence (H3). To 
also compare auditor behavior to the behavior of those from psychology 
experiments, I examine auditor decision making in a non-audit task to determine 
whether it is the auditing environment or trait skepticism that causes or prevents 
auditors from using the confidence heuristic (RQ1a and RQ1b).  
CHAPTER III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 I conduct an experiment to test my hypotheses. The experiment examines the 
effects of client expressions of confidence on auditors’ judgments.  My main 
experiment tests H1, H2, and H3 and the supplemental (non-audit) task that follows 
the main experiment tests the research questions.  Through a joint effort from the 
CAQ and the Big 4 firms, experienced auditor participants completed a case study 
online which asked them to assume the role of a senior auditor conducting client 
inquiry regarding an inventory obsolescence issue.  The case provided background 
and financial information about the client. The experimental materials were reviewed 
by executives at three of the Big 4 firms for content, realism, and relevance. The 
primary task was to assess the extent to which the auditor will rely on the client 
explanation for the inventory valuation and to assess the extent of testing the auditor 
would perform for the current client based on the client explanation relative to th
extent of testing they anticipated based on the client’s size and industry. The online 
survey program captured all assessment measures, demographic measures, and time 







Sixty eight senior auditors (with 2-5 years of audit experience) from Big 4 
auditing firms participated in the study.  Discussions with auditors indicate that 
auditors at this level would have adequate experience to complete the task. These 
auditors were provided through my Center for Audit Quality Academic Research in 
Auditing Grant. Demographic information is provided in Table 2.5  
Design, Task, and Manipulations  
I use a 2x2 between participants design to test the auditors’ reactions to 
clients’ expressions of confidence (see Figure 4, cells 1, 2, 3, and 4) in control and 
business environments of varying strength. This design results in four between-
participants conditions: strong environment-confidence present, strong environment-
confidence absent, weak environment-confidence present, and weak environment-
confidence absent. Auditors completed the experiment by clicking on a link (that 
randomly assigned auditors to one of four conditions) to the online case found in an 
email sent to them by an executive from their firm.6  Auditors were presented with 
client background and financial information for a technology company. I developed 
the company information using a modified version of materials used by Robertson 
(2010) and Fanning and Piercey (2010). After auditors reviewed information about 
                                                          
5 Three of these auditors completed the case at a later d te and were not randomly assigned to 
conditions. Instead, they were assigned to the s rong environment-confidence present condition. This 
was because in the initial run of the experiment, a rel tively low number of auditors passed the 
manipulation check in this condition. Completing the analyses without these three participants does 
not qualitatively change the results. 
6 Due to firm policy, one of the participating firms completed a paper instrument (n=18). The 
instrument was split into two envelopes to ensure aditors would not look back at information once 
they began to provide assessments. Auditors participating in the online version were able to navigate 
among the screens. However, once they began to provide assessments, they were no longer allowed to 
navigate backwards. The results for participants who completed the online instrument do not 





the technology company, they received a description of noteworthy aspects of the 
control and business environment assessment completed by other audit team 
members. The control and business environment is manipulated at two levels, strong 
environment and weak environment. Auditors in the strong environment condition 
were informed that other audit team members noted that the control and business 
environment included (1) distributing and discussing a code of conduct (i.e., stronger 
tone at the top), (2) an audit committee that conducted detailed reviews (i.e., more 
effective audit committee), (3) competent employees who have experience and 
knowledge in the industry (i.e., higher commitment to competence), and (4) no 
strong concern regarding analysts’ forecasts (i.e., lower management reporting 
incentives). Auditors in the weak environment condition were informed that other 
audit team members noted that the control and business environment included: (1) 
distributing a code of conduct but not discussing it with employees (i.e., weaker tone 
at the top), (2) an audit committee that conducted high level reviews (i.e., less 
effective audit committee), (3) the presence of recent turnover in some management 
positions and a struggle to fill job openings with qualified people (i.e., lower 
commitment to competence), and a strong concern regarding analysts’ forecasts 
(higher management reporting incentives).  
Next, the auditors were provided with the controller response to the auditor’s 
inquiry regarding the auditor’s assessment of inventory value in the face of potential 
inventory obsolescence. This judgment requires complex estimates and a high level 
of judgment. Therefore, a wide range of possibilities are appropriate.  The controller 





no expression of confidence (confidence absent) or an expression of confidence 
(confidence present) (i.e., “I suppose it’s….” vs. “I’m absolutely certain it's …”).7 
The controller’s response indicates a competitor has developed a more advanced 
technological product, but that the company’s product is available in more colors. 
Additionally, the controller’s response also states that the company has an 
established reputation, the competitor’s product is being sold at a lower price, and 
that the company has experience selling older products in developing countries at 
reduced prices. Information in the client’s response is held constant and includes 
some statements that support the booked value and others that are less supportive. 
Again, this allows for a wide range of possible responses.  
After reading the background information, information regarding the control 
and business environment, and the clients’ inventory explanation, auditors responded 
to the following dependent variables for the audit task: (1) to what extent they will 
rely on the client explanation regarding the inventory valuation and  (2) the extent of 
testing they would perform for the current client based on the client explanation 
relative to the extent of testing they anticipated based on the client’s size and 
industry.8 Responses were marked on an 11-point Likert scales numbered from 
                                                          
7 Wesson and Pulford (2009) evaluate 30 expressions of confidence and find that “I’m positive it’s.”, 
I’m confident it’s…”, “I know it's…”, “I know for a fact that it’s”, and “I'm absolutely certain it's…” 
are the five highest rated expressions of confidence, respectively. Additionally, they find “I'm not 
sure, it's kind of…”, “Oh, I don't know, I suppose it's…”, “I suppose it could be…” “I'm guessing, but 
I would say it's…”, and “I think it's…. isn't it?” are the five lowest rated expressions of confidence, 
respectively. The authors find that “I think it’s…”, “I could be mistaken, but I’m sure it’s…” ,“I 
suspect it’s…”, “I would say it’s…” , and “I believe it’s…” were ranked in the middle of the scale. 
8 Participants provided responses to additional questions. Participants selected additional procedures 
required for the inventory valuation (up to 8) (e.g., discuss possible obsolescence and overstock of 
inventory with operating personnel, verify that employees are tagging obsolete items, etc.). 
Participants also judged the likelihood the inventory will need to be written down. The scale ranged 
from 1 (not likely) to 11(very likely). For completeness, the results of these measures are provided in 





1(will not rely at all) to 11 (completely rely) for the first question. For the second 
question auditors provided responses on an 11-point Likert scale numbered from -5 
(decreased inventory testing) to +5 (increased inventory testing) (See Exhibit 1). In 
addition to responding to these dependent variables, auditors responded to questions 
designed to understand their interpretation of the expression of confidence (i.e., as 
reliability or deception). The questions are provided and discussed later. Auditors 
also provided an explanation of why they chose their specific level of reliance on th
client explanation 
All auditors completed a non-audit task (administered using a between 
subjects design) following the main experiment; this task was used to test RQ1a and 
RQ1b. This task involved a restaurant review and is a modified version of the task 
used in Karmarkar and Tormala (2010).9  Auditors read a restaurant review from one 
of two online blogs (written by a non-expert blogger).10 One blog provides the 
restaurant review with an expression of confidence (i.e., “I can confidently give 
Bianco a rating of 4 (out of 5) stars.”) (labeled confidence present) and the other blog 
provides the restaurant review without an expression of confidence (i.e., “I don’t 
have complete confidence in my opinion, but I suppose I would give Bianco a rating 
of 4 (out of 5) stars.”) (labeled confidence absent). All other aspects of the two 
online blogs are identical. The task asked auditors to provide their interest in having
                                                          
9 I selected the restaurant review task for the non-audit task for several reasons. (1) This task allows 
for the comparison of auditor behavior to non-auditor behavior in the same task. (2) The restaurant 
reviewer, like the controller in the audit task, has a persuasion motive. (3) Like the audit task, the 
restaurant review task provides background information regarding the restaurant reviewer which has 
implications for the credibility of the restaurant reviewer.(4) Neither task had an objective answer 
(i.e., both judgments are subjective in nature). 
10 A non-expert in this context is a person who writes a blog in their spare time (rather than 






a meal at the reviewed restaurant (i erest), the dependent variable. Auditors 
provided the response on a Likert scale numbered from 1 (not at all interested) to 9 
(extremely interested) for interest.11 In addition to responding to these dependent 
variables, auditors responded to questions designed to understand their perception of 
the restaurant reviewer. The questions are listed below.  
After completing both tasks, auditors completed manipulation check 
questions. Specifically, auditors respond to questions of whether the restaurant 
reviewer and controller expressed confidence, the strength of the tone at the top and 
audit committee, and whether the company had incentives to meet analysts’ 
forecasts. 
 Additionally, auditors completed the Hurtt scale to measure their individual 
levels of trait skepticism.  Auditors also responded to questions that indicate their 
perception of the controller (restaurant reviewer) providing the expression of 
confidence. The first six measures together capture the perception of the c n roller 
(restaurant reviewer), and the seventh measure captures the potential for persuasion.  
These latter questions are listed below.  Responses for questions 1-6 were provid d 
on an 11-point Likert scale with the endpoints of 1 (“not at all [insert 
characteristic]”) to 11 (extremely [insert characteristic].” Responses for question 7 
were provided as a “yes” or “no” response.  
1. How competent did you perceive the controller/restaurant 
reviewer to be? 
                                                          
11 To determine why auditors chose that level of interest, auditors responded to the following: (1) how 
surprising they found the restaurant review (surprising), and (2) how unexpected they found the 
restaurant review (unexpected) (Karmarkar and Tormala 2010).  For surprising and unexpected, 
auditors provided the responses on a Likert scale with the following endpoints: 1 (not at all 





2. How accurate did you perceive the controller/restaurant reviewer 
to be?  
3. How trustworthy did you perceive the controller/restaurant 
reviewer to be? 
4. How honest did you perceive the controller/restaurant reviewer to 
be? 
5. How reliable did you perceive the controller/restaurant reviewer 
to be? 
6. How deceptive did you perceive the controller/restaurant reviewer 
to be? 
7. Do you think the controller/restaurant reviewer had a strong desire 
for you to rely on the explanation/review? 
 
Preliminary Pilot Test of the Manipulations 
My experiment requires the participants to examine various cues from the 
control and business environment. One concern is that the cues provided for the 
control environment may lead to a ceiling effect (i.e., the auditors would select the 
maximum level of testing regardless of the expression of confidence).  I designed a 
pilot test to compare how participants respond to various combinations of control 
environment cues. I examined three conditions: one in which the participant was 
provided cues regarding the tone at the top, audit committee strength, and 
commitment to competence; the second condition provided the participant cues 
regarding the tone at the top and competence; and the third condition provided the 
participant cues regarding the commitment to competence. All cue combinations 
were meant to suggest the control environment was weak, and I tested whether 
participants interpreted the cues as an indication of a weak control environment. A 
group of 10 former/current internal and external auditors participated in the pilot 
study via an online survey instrument. The auditors provided their overall assessment 






I conducted a t-test to obtain means for each of the three conditions and 
determine that the means were different from the endpoints of the scale (1 and 11). 
The means were: 4.66, 4.25, and 5.33, respectively.12 This indicates that none of the 
weak control environment descriptions would likely lead to a ceiling effect. Thus, 
participants should have room to respond to the client expression of confidence 
within the weak control and business environment experimental condition, regardless 
of the number of cues. The next section describes a second pilot test designed to 
capture current external auditors’ judgments of control environment strength a d to 
evaluate current external auditors’ interpretations of expressions of confidence. 
CAQ Pilot Test of the Manipulations 
My experiment requires the participants to examine various cues from the 
control and business environment. One concern is that the cues provided for the 
control and business environment may lead to a floor and ceiling effect.  I designed 
the pilot test to compare how participants respond to (1) the strong control and 
business environment and (2) the weak control and business environment.  Auditors 
were selected and contacted directly by a senior member of a Big 4 firm. Eighteen 
auditors from all Big 4 firms completed the study. Their experience ranged from 2-5 
years. Auditors were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. Auditors 
completed the pilot via an online survey instrument.  Auditors provided their overall 
assessment of the control and business environment using an 11-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 “weak” to 11 “strong.” 
                                                          
12 There was a significant difference between the mean of each condition and the endpoint of 1(t=5.5, 
5.17, 2.91, all p< 0.015). There was a significant difference between the mean of each condition and 





I conducted a t-test to obtain means for each of the two conditions and 
determined that the means were different from the endpoints of the scale (1 and 11). 
The mean for the strong control and business environment condition was 7.88 and 
the mean for the weak control and business environment condition was 3.1.13  This 
indicates that none of the control and business environment descriptions was likely 
to have a floor or ceiling effect and that both (strong and weak) portrayed the 
appropriate level of strength. Thus, participants should have room to respond to the 
client expression of confidence within the weak and strong control and business 
environment experimental conditions. 
In addition to evaluating the control and business environment, auditors 
evaluated their interpretations of eleven phrases that indicated either the presence of 
confidence or the absence of confidence. The phrases are shown in Table 1.  I 
performed this pilot test because auditors interpretations of the phrases may be
dependent on the context (i.e., the audit context may impact the auditors’ 
interpretations of the phrases). Therefore, the results of Wesson and Pulford (2009) 
regarding the interpretation of confidence expressions may not apply to my 
experiment. The auditors were asked to evaluate the potential for inventory 
obsolescence for their client based on a client response to the auditor’s inquiry 
regarding the inventory valuation. The client explanation reads “[Insert confidence 
expression from Table 1] we can sell the inventory in developing countries.” That is, 
                                                          
13 There was a significant difference between the mean of each condition and the endpoint of 1 (for 
the strong control and business environment t=12.22 and for the weak control and business 
environment t= 6.82, all p< 0.00006). There was a significant difference between the mean of each 
condition and the endpoint of 11 (for the strong contr l and business environment t=-5.51 and for the 





the client explanation is prefaced with the expressions of confidence listed in Table 
1.  The auditors provide their assessment of how confident the client is that the 
inventory can be sold using an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “not confident” 
to 11 “extremely confident.” I computed means and standard deviations for all of the 
phrases which are provided in Table 1.  Based on these results, I use “I’m absolutely 
certain…” for the confidence present condition because it conveys a higher level of 
confidence (mean=9.08), and I use “I suppose…” for the confidence absent condition 
because it conveys a lower level of confidence (mean=3.66).   
CHAPTER IV. RESULTS 
Audit Task 
Manipulation Checks 
 To determine if auditors perceived the control environment to be strong or 
weak, I examine auditors’ responses to the following questions, (1) “Please evaluat  
the strength of the tone at the top” and (2) “Please evaluate the strength of the audi  
committee.” Responses to these questions were provided on a scale ranging from 
1(weak) to 11(strong). In the strong control environment condition, the auditors’ 
combined mean assessment of the strength of the audit committee and the strength of 
the tone at the top was 6.88.  In the w ak control environment condition, the 
auditors’ combined mean assessment of the strength of the audit committee and h
strength of the tone at the top was 3.67.  Overall, auditors’ average ratings of the 
strength of the audit committee and tone at the top are higher in the strong control 
and business environment condition than the weak control and business environment 





manipulations were effective.14 
To determine if auditors noticed that the controller expressed or did not 
express confidence, I examine auditors’ responses to the following question, “Did 
the controller express confidence in his/her explanation regarding the inventory 
account?” Auditors answered with a yes or no response. If auditors responded 
consistently with the manipulation, then they were counted as passing the confidence 
manipulation check. The rate of correct responses is 84% (n= 57). In the confidence 
present condition, 90% (n=30) of participants correctly indicated that the expression 
of confidence indicated the presence of confidence, and 77% (n=27) of participants 
in the confidence absent condition correctly indicated that the expression of 
confidence indicated the absence of confidence. Given the importance of expressed 
confidence to the study, I use this final sample of 57 auditors for the analysis.15   
Auditors also assessed the realism of the case on a scale ranging from 1 (n t 
at all realistic) to 11 (extremely realistic). The auditors judged it to have an average 
amount of realism (mean of 6.38). This assessment is not affected by the independent 
variables or their interaction.  
 Main Analysis – Test of H1, H2, and H3 
My analysis of the effect of the client’s expressed confidence on auditors’ 
judgments is divided into an analysis of the following dependent variables: the 
                                                          
14 To determine if auditors perceived management to have reporting incentives, auditors responded to 
the following question, “Did the company have incentives to meet analysts’ forecasts?” Auditors 
provided a yes or no response. As a result of the company being described as a public company, many 
auditors assumed the company had incentives to meet analysts’ forecasts. Therefore, only 64% of the 
participants (n=44) answered this question as intended. However, since the questions regarding the 
tone at the top and the audit committee indicate that participants understood the differences in the 
control environment manipulations, this question was not used in the manipulation check analysis.   






reliance on client explanation (labeled rely) and the extent of testing they would 
perform for the current client based on the client explanation relative to the extent of 
testing they anticipated based on the client’s size and industry (labeled extent).16 
First, I examine rely. As shown in Table 3 Panel A, the main effect of c nfidence in 
the ANOVA (analysis of variance) model is not statistically significant (F = 0.12, p < 
0.73). Furthermore, as shown in Table 3 Panel A, the main effect of control and 
business environment in the ANOVA model is not statistically significant (F = 2.77, 
p < 0.10).  For further insight, I examine participants’ reasons for their responses 
provided for rely. Specifically, the participants were asked to explain why they chose 
their indicated level of reliance. Most participants suggested they could not purely
rely on the client explanation due to the requirements of the auditing standards. This 
suggests that rely is an insensitive measure and is not an appropriate measure for this 
study. In contrast, extent is not subject to the same limitations since this question 
asked auditors to make a specific judgment related to the client explanation. 
Therefore, extent will be used as the main dependent variable for the remaining 
analyses. 
As shown in Table 4 Panel A, the mean extent judgments are 2.00 and 2.25 
for the confidence present and confidence absent conditions, respectively. The main 
effect of confidence in the ANOVA model is not statistically significant (F = 0.49, p 
< 0.49), as shown in Table 4 Panel B. This suggests H1 and H2 are not supported. 
That is, auditors do not consistently use expressed confidence as a cue for either 
                                                          
16 Participants provided responses on an 11- point Likert scale numbered from 1 (low) to 11 (high) for 
rely, and participants provided responses on an 11 - point Likert scale numbered from -5 (decreased 





reliability (H1) or deception (H2).   However, the ANOVA model indicates the 
interaction of confidence and control and business environment (F=5.20, p < 0.03) is 
statistically significant (see Table 4 Panel B).17 This may provide support for the 
neutral view of professional skepticism (H3) depending on the specific form of the
interaction. Simple main effects are used to investigate the interaction further. As 
shown in Table 4 Panel C, I find that auditors used the confidence heuristic in the 
weak environment condition (F=4.52, p < 0.04) but did not use the confidence 
heuristic in the strong environment condition (F=1.23, p < 0.27). Within the weak 
environment condition, the mean extent judgment is greater in the confidence absent 
condition (mean of 2.93) than that in the confidence present condition (mean of 
1.93). Therefore, the pattern of means is not consistent with H3.  
Analysis of Auditors’ Views of Skepticism 
A potential reason for the lack of support for H2 (i.e., auditors using 
expressions of confidence as a cue for deception) is that it is dependent on auditors 
adopting a presumptive doubt view of skepticism. Auditors responded to two 
questions to investigate whether they adopt a presumptive doubt view or neutral 
view of skepticism, skepticism and truth bias. The first question (labeled skepticism) 
asked auditors to describe how they apply the skeptical mindset. The scale ranged 
from 1 (“I interpret the auditing standards to require me to evaluate evidence 
objectively, with no presumptions”) to 11 (“I interpret the auditing standards to 
                                                          
17 When I include all of the 68 auditors, the interaction of confidence and the control environment on 
the extent dependent variable remains statistically significant (F=4.22, p < 0.04). Furthermore, the 
main effect of control environment on the extent dependent variable remains statistically significant 
(F=5.91, p < 0.02), while the main effect of confidence on the extent dependent variable remains 
statistically not significant (F=0.19, p < 0.67). Including the demographic variables (listed in Table 2) 





require me to evaluate evidence with a presumption that an error or misstatement 
exists”).  The mean response to this question is 4.77, indicating that auditors largely 
do not assume a presumptive doubt mindset when applying a skeptical mindset.18 
Instead, auditors assume a more neutral mindset. I also examine the frequency 
distribution of the responses to this question. Thirty nine auditors selected responses 
below the midpoint of the scale, and 18 auditors selected responses above the 
midpoint of the scale, also indicating that auditors are more likely to adopt a neutral 
mindset when applying a skeptical mindset.19 Additionally, auditors responded to a 
question that measured whether they had a truth bias during an audit (labeled truth 
bias). Prior literature suggests people are unable to detect deception because most 
people have a truth bias, i.e., they take statements at face value. The measure read, 
“While engaged in an audit, I have a tendency to judge explanations from clients:” 
The scale ranged from 1(“mostly as falsehoods”) to 11 (“mostly as truths”). The 
midpoint of the scale is 6 (“neutral”). The mean response to this question is 6.78, 
indicating auditors do not have a truth bias when conducting an audit. Instead, they 
maintain a neutral mindset when applying skepticism.20, 21 I also examine the 
                                                          
18 There was a statistically significant difference between the mean of 4.77 and the endpoint of 1 
(t=12.64, p< 0.0001). There was a statistically significant difference between the mean of 4.77 and the 
midpoint of 6 (t=-4.12, p< 0.0001). 
19 I used an ANCOVA model to determine if the auditors’ extent judgments were dependent on the 
auditors’ skepticism score. In the ANCOVA, extent was the dependent variable, confidence and 
control and business environment were the independent variables, and the sk pticism score was the 
covariate. The ANCOVA reveals that the covariate sk pticism score was not statistically significant 
(F=0.10, p < 0.75) and that the interaction of the independent variables (confidence and control and 
business environment) remains statistically significant (F=5.10, p < 0.03). Additionally, the 
ANCOVA model indicates the interaction of confidence and skepticism and the interaction of control 
environment and skepticism are not statistically significant (F=0.01, p < 0.93 and F=0.03, p < 0.87, 
respectively). 
20 There was a statistically significant difference between the mean of 6.78 and the endpoint of 1 






frequency distribution of the responses to this question. Fifteen auditors selected 
responses below the midpoint of the scale and 42 auditors selected responses above 
the midpoint of the scale, suggesting a tendency towards accepting statements as 
truths. However, the mean of 6.78 indicated a weak rather than a strong tendency.22 
These results provide additional motivation for positing H3; the neutral view of 
skepticism suggests an interactive effect of confidence and control and business 
environment on auditors’ judgments of extent.23, 24   
Analysis of the Effects of Inconsistencies on Auditors’ Judgments 
I examine two additional judgments based on the Karmarkar and Tormala 
(2010) study to determine the reason for the auditors’ response to confidence. 
Karmarkar and Tormala (2010) found that participants used the confidence heuristic 
when an inconsistency between expertise and the expression of confidence was 
present. The reason for these findings is that participants experienced a high level of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
endpoint of 11 (t = -22.33, p < 0.0001). There was a statistically significant difference between the 
mean of 6.78 and the midpoint of 6 (t= 4.19, p < 0.00 1). 
21 The responses to both the truth bias question and the skepticism question are not significantly 
different across cells or affected by the treatments. 
22I used an ANCOVA model to determine if the auditors’ extent judgments were dependent on the 
auditors’ truth bias score. In the ANCOVA, extent was the dependent variable, confidence and control 
and business environment were the independent variables, and the truth bias score was the covariate. 
The ANCOVA reveals that the covariate truth bias score was not statistically significant (F=1.06, p <
0.30) and that the interaction of the independent variables (confidence and control and business 
environment) remains statistically significant (F=5.76, p < 0.02). Additionally, the ANCOVA model 
indicates the interaction of confidence and truth bias and the interaction of control environment and 
truth bias are not statistically significant (F=0.51, p < 0.43 and F 0.52, p < 0.47, respectively). 
23 To further explore the impact of the neutral mindset, I examine whether skepticism and/or truth bias 
mediate the relation between the dependent variable, ext nt, and the independent variable, confidence. 
However, I do not find evidence that skepticism and truth bias are mediators.    
24 I used an ANCOVA to determine if the auditors’ extent judgments were dependent on the auditors’ 
trait skepticism. In the ANCOVA, extent was the dependent variable, confidence and control and 
business environment were the independent variables, and the Hurtt scale score (labeled as Hurtt) was 
the covariate. The ANCOVA reveals that the covariate Hurtt was not statistically significant (F=0.67, 
p < 0.42) and that the interaction of the independent variables (confidence and control and business 
environment) remains statistically significant (F=4.52, p < 0.04). Additionally, the ANCOVA 
indicates the interaction of confidence and Hurtt and the interaction of control environment and Hurtt 
are not statistically significant (F=0.72, p < 0.40 and F=1.50, p < 0.22, respectively). The analysis of 





unexpectedness and surprise during the task which resulted in increased processing 
by the participants, leading to greater persuasion. Participants in my experiment 
judged (1) how unexpected they found the client explanation (unexpected) and (2) 
how surprising they found the client explanation (surprising).25 For the analysis, 
each participant’s judgments of surprise and unexpected are averaged together to 
form one measure, consistent with Karmarkar and Tormala (2010). The mean 
assessment of the average of unexpected and surprising is then analyzed via an 
ANOVA model with confidence and control and business environment as 
independent factors. The ANOVA indicates the interaction of confidence and the 
control environment is not statistically significant (F= 1.16, p < 0.29).26 These results 
are inconsistent with the Karmarkar and Tormala (2010) study and suggest 
participants did not find the inconsistency between the strong (weak) control and 
business environment and the absence (presence) of an expression of confidence 
unexpected and surprising.  
Discussion of Results 
Overall, these results indicate that auditors’ reactions to expressed confi ence 
were dependent on the decision making environment. When the control and business 
environment was strong, auditors relied on information from the environment and 
did not use the expressed confidence in their decision making. In contrast, when the 
control and business environment was weak, auditors relied (positively) on the 
expression of confidence. While unexpected, these results suggest a couple of 
                                                          
25 The scale for unexpected ranged from 1 (not at all unexpected) to 9 (extremely unexpected). The 
scale for suprising ranged from 1 (not at all surprising) to 9 (extremely surprising). 





potential explanations. One potential reason for this effect may be that auditors found 
the weak control environment to be associated with information uncertainty (Beneish 
et al. 2008). As a result, auditors were motivated to reduce uncertainty by relying on 
the controller expressing confidence (Loewenstein 1994). Secondly, auditors may 
have experienced high cognitive load under the weak control environment condition. 
When people experience high cognitive load, they are more likely to use heuristics. 
Auditors may have experienced high cognitive load in the weak control and business 
environment setting because the information cues that suggested risk required 
increased processing. Both of these explanations provide opportunities for further 
research in this area. 
Supplemental Analysis 
As a supplementary analysis, I examine participants perceptions of the 
controller based on the expression of confidence or no confidence and the control 
environment strength. I create a composite score of the perception of the controller 
by using the mean of participants’ responses to questions measuring the construct. I 
refer to this composite score as ‘perception of the controller’. The perception of the 
controller judgment is measured as the average of perceived reliability, perceived 
trustworthiness, perceived honesty, perceived accuracy, perceived competence, and 
perceived deceptiveness of the controller.27 Participants’ responses to the perception 
of the controller questions indicated that all 6 questions captured the same 
                                                          
27 The perception of the controller score is composed of participants’ responses to the following 
questions “How competent did you perceive the controller to be?,” “How accurate did you perceive 
the controller to be?,” “How trustworthy did you perc ive the controller to be?,” “How honest did you 
perceive the controller to be?,” “How reliable did you perceive the controller to be?” and “How 
deceptive did you perceive the controller to be?” All responses were provided on 11-point Likert 
scales with the endpoints of 1 (not at all [insert characteristic]) to 11 (extremely [insert 





underlying construct, with Cronbach’s alpha of 0.88. The mean assessment of the 
perception of the controller score is then analyzed via an ANOVA model with 
confidence and control and business environment as independent factors. The main 
effect of confidence in the ANOVA model is not statistically significant (F=0.00, p < 
0.95).28 The mean perception of the controller judgments are 5.46 and 5.43 for the 
confidence present and confidence absent conditions, respectively. The main effect 
of control and business environment i  the ANOVA model is marginally statistically 
significant (F=3.07, p < 0.09). The mean perception of the controller judgments are 
5.79 and 5.12 for the strong environment and weak environment conditions, 
respectively. The effect of the interaction of confidence and the control and business 
environment in the ANOVA model is not statistically significant (F=1.44, p < 
0.39).29  Together, these results imply that participants perceived the controller in a 
somewhat more (less) positive manner in the strong environment (weak 
environment) condition.30  
To further gain an understanding regarding the auditors’ perception of the 
controller, auditors also responded to a question regarding whether the controller was 
attempting to be persuasive. The question read “Do you think the controller had a 
strong desire for you to rely on the explanation?,” and participants responded with a 
yes or no response. In the confidence present (confidence absent) conditions, 70.18 
(29.82) percent of auditors believed the controller was attempting to be persuasive 
                                                          
28 This result is untabulated. 
29 To further explore the impact of the perception of the controller judgments, I examine whether the 
perception of the controller mediates the relation between the dependent variable, extent, and the 
independent variable, confidence. However, I do not find evidence that the perception of the controller 
is a mediator.    





(Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.0001). This suggests auditors viewed the expression of 
confidence as a persuasion mechanism. 
Non-audit task 
Manipulation check 
To determine if auditors noticed if the restaurant reviewer expressed or did 
not express confidence, I examine auditors’ responses to the following question, 
“Did the restaurant reviewer express confidence in the restaurant review?”  The rate 
of correct responses is 74%, leaving a sample of 50 auditors for the analysis.31  
Analysis of RQ1a  
Recall that I use the same task as Karmarkar and Tormala (2010) in order to 
determine if auditors use the confidence heuristic in a non-audit task. Using this task 
allows for the comparison of auditor behavior to non-auditor behavior in the same 
task.  I test RQ1a, regarding the auditor’s use of the confidence heuristic in a non-
audit task, using a t-test. The auditor’s interest in eating at the reviewed r staurant 
(labeled interest) is used as the dependent variable.  As shown in Table 5, there was 
no statistically significant difference in the mean interest judgments for the 
confidence present and confidence absent conditions (t=0.34, p < 0.74, confidence 
present mean=6.09 versus confidence absent mean=5.94). This suggests auditors did 
not use the confidence heuristic and is inconsistent with the results of Karmarkar and 
Tormala (2010) who found evidence of the confidence heuristic.  I also examine two 
additional judgments based on the Karmarkar and Tormala (2010) study to determine 
                                                          
31 Incorrect responses were clustered in the confidence absent condition.  Of the 50 participants 
responding correctly, 32 participants were in the confidence present condition and 18 participants 
were in confidence absent condition. Therefore, the rate of correct responses i  94% in the confidence 





why the auditors did not use the confidence heuristic. Auditors judged (1) how 
unexpected the auditors found the restaurant review (labeled as unexpected) and (2) 
how surprising the auditors found the restaurant review (labeled as surprising).32  I 
analyze the average of these variables, consistent with Karmarkar and Tormala 
(2010). Karmarkar and Tormala found that participants used the confidence heuristic 
when an inconsistency between expertise and the expression of confidence was 
present. The reason for these findings is that participants experienced a high level of 
unexpectedness and surprise from the restaurant review which resulted in increased 
processing of the review by the participants, leading to greater persuasion. The 
average of unexpected and surprising is used as the dependent variable for the t-test.  
As shown in Table 5, there was no statistically significant difference in the average 
of the unexpected and surprising judgments for the confidence present and 
confidence absent conditions (t=-0.26, p < 0.79, confidence present mean=3.91 
versus confidence absent mean=4.08).  These results are inconsistent with the 
Karmarkar and Tormala study and suggest that my study participants (auditors) 
judged the restaurant review differently than the undergraduate participan s n the 
Karmarkar and Tormala (2010) study. Interestingly, auditors behaved consistently 
across the audit and non-audit task. When auditors made judgments in a less risky 
environment and an environment associated with less information uncertainty (i.e., 
the non-audit task and the audit task with the strong control and business 
environment), auditors did not use expressed confidence in their decision making. In 
contrast, when auditors were in a riskier environment and an environment associated 
                                                          
32 Both unexpected and surprising were evaluated on a scale from 1 (not at all surprising/unexpected) 





with more information uncertainty (i.e., the audit task with the weak control and 
business environment), auditors used expressed confidence in their decision making.  
Supplemental Analysis of RQ1a 
 As a supplementary analysis, I examine auditors’ perception of the restaurant 
reviewer in the non-audit task. I create a composite score of the perception of the 
restaurant reviewer by using the mean of participants’ responses to questions 
measuring the construct. I refer to this composite score as ‘perception of the 
restaurant reviewer.’ The perception of the restaurant reviewer score i  composed of 
an average of perceived reliability, perceived trustworthiness, perceived hon sty, 
perceived accuracy, perceived competence, and perceived deceptiveness of the 
restaurant reviewer.33 Participants’ responses to the perception of the restaurant 
reviewer questions indicated that all 6 questions captured the same underlying 
construct, with Cronbach’s alpha of 0.74. The mean assessment of the perception of 
the restaurant reviewer score is then analyzed via an ANOVA model with confidence 
as the independent factor. The main effect of confidence in the ANOVA model is not 
statistically significant (F=0.54, p < 0.47). The mean perception of the restaurant 
reviewer judgments are 6.51 and 6.22 for the confidence present and confidence 
                                                          
33 The perception of the restaurant reviewer score is composed of participants’ responses to the 
following questions “How competent did you perceive th  restaurant reviewer to be?,” “How accurate 
did you perceive the restaurant reviewer to be?,” “How trustworthy did you perceive the restaurant 
reviewer to be?,” “How honest did you perceive the restaurant reviewer to be?,” “How reliable did 
you perceive the restaurant reviewer to be?,” and “How deceptive did you perceive the restaurant 
reviewer to be?”All responses were provided on 11-point Likert scales with the endpoints of 1 (not at 
all [insert characteristic]) to 11 (extremely [insert characteristic]). The responses to the question 





absent conditions, respectively. Together, these results imply the participants did not 
perceive the restaurant reviewer differently regardless of the condition.34  
To further gain an understanding regarding the auditors’ perception of the 
restaurant reviewer, auditors also responded to a question regarding whether t e 
restaurant reviewer was attempting to be persuasive. The question read “Do you 
think the restaurant reviewer had a strong desire for you to rely on the review?,” and 
participants provided a yes or no response. In the confidence present (confidence 
absent) conditions, 95.83 (42.31) percent of auditors believed the restaurant reviewer 
was attempting to be persuasive (Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.0001). This suggests 
auditors viewed the expression of confidence as a persuasion mechanism. 
Analysis of RQ1b 
I examine RQ1b, suggesting the auditor’s use of the confidence heuristic is 
dependent on the auditor’s own trait level of skepticism, by using an ANCOVA 
model with the Hurtt scale (labeled as Hurtt) measure as the covariate.35 I compare 
the auditors’ responses to the dependent variable nterest and examine Hurtt as a 
covariate and confidence as the independent variable. I find that the effect of Hurtt is 
marginally significant (F=1.89, p < 0.09). Furthermore, the main effect of confidence 
(F=0.00, p < 0.94) along with the effect of the interaction of confidence and Hurtt 
(F=1.24, p < 0.33) are both not statistically significant. Overall, this indicates the use 
                                                          
34 These results are untablulated. 
35 The mean response to Hurtt is 75.72 and the median response is 74.50.The Hurtt scale mean and 
median for my study are consistent with prior studies examining the Hurtt Scale (e.g., Hurtt (2010)). 
The Hurtt scale scores for my study ranged from 54 to 93. Hurtt (2010) finds that student scores on 
the Hurtt scale generally range from 50 to 100. Hurtt (2010) finds that the mean Hurtt scale score for 





of the confidence heuristic is not dependent on trait skepticism.36 
CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION 
I examine the effects of client expressions of confidence on auditor 
judgments. I develop competing hypotheses using the confidence heuristic from the 
psychology literature and the construct of skepticism from the auditing standards. 
Results from my study indicate that auditors use the confidence heuristic in risky 
situations (i.e., when the client control and business environment is weak). In 
contrast, auditors do not use expressed confidence in their decision making when the 
situation is less risky (i.e., when the control and business environment is strong or in 
a non-audit task). Specifically, when the client had a strong control and business 
environment setting, auditors relied on the environment rather than the expressed 
confidence for their decision making. In contrast, when the client had a weak control 
and business environment, auditors could not rely on the environment and 
consequently used the confidence heuristic.  
These results suggest several potential explanations. One potential reason for 
this effect may be that auditors found the weak control environment to be associated 
with information uncertainty (Beneish et al. 2008). As a result, auditors were 
motivated to reduce uncertainty by relying on the controller expressing confidence 
(Loewenstein 1994). Secondly, auditors may have experienced high cognitive load 
under the weak control environment condition. When people experience high 
cognitive load, they are more likely to use heuristics. Auditors may have experienced 
high cognitive load in the weak control and business environment setting because the 
                                                          





information cues that suggested risk required increased processing. Thirdly, auditors 
may have exercised high effort to process the cues in the weak control and busi ess 
environment. The high effort may have been the result of the presence of risk in that 
environment.  When people are faced with a high effort task, people use heuristics to 
reduce the cognitive effort associated with the task by examining “fewer cues” and 
“integrating less information” (Shah and Oppenheimer 2008). This suggests auditors 
focused on the expression of confidence cue and did not integrate this cue with the 
control and business environment cue. Finally, the control and business environment 
may have shifted the way in which auditors weighed cues in the task. In the weak 
control and business environment, participants could not use the central cues (i.e., 
the control and business environment components) because they were not reliable, so 
participants may have processed the peripheral cue (expression or no expression of 
confidence) instead (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). All of these explanations provide 
opportunities for further research in this area. 
Results of my study will make auditors aware of characteristics, such as 
expressions of confidence, which may cause them to exercise a lower level of 
skepticism; therefore, auditors can consider such characteristics when interacting 
with the client. Additionally, this study helps explain why, in some instances, 
auditors may rely on management explanation when it is more appropriate to collect 
additional substantive evidence.  
My study contributes to two areas of literature. First, my study expands the 
accounting literature regarding professional skepticism by examining whether 





characteristics such as expressed confidence. Additionally, my study examines 
whether auditors adopt a presumptive doubt view of skepticism or a neutral view of 
skepticism. Furthermore, my study improves people’s understanding of why auditors 
may over-rely on management explanations and is the first to examine expressed 
confidence in an auditing context.  Moreover, my study expands the growing 
financial accounting literature regarding manager confidence (Hribar et al. 2011; 
Hirshleifer et al. 2010; Hilary et al. 2011; Libby et al. 2010) by examining the effects 
of manager confidence in the auditing context. Secondly, this study contributes to the 
psychology literature.  Prior psychology literature has not examined expressed 
confidence in a setting in which the two parties do not necessarily have a completely 
cooperative relationship.      
My study is subject to several limitations. First, the level of skepticism the 
auditor exercises in an experimental setting may be lower than that which is 
displayed in a real world auditing task.  Typically, audit firms provide firm policies 
and procedures that ensure the auditor exercises skepticism.  However, this concern
is mitigated to the extent that auditors will internalize this required levelof 
skepticism and bring it to the experimental task.  Second, my experiment does not 
take into consideration the past relationship between the client and the auditor. 
Future research could examine to what extent these relationships affect the use of 
client characteristics by the auditor.   
This research has significant implications for future research in auditing and 
the practice of auditing. The results of this research can be incorporated in th  





Advisors 2010). Future research can examine expressed confidence in other areas of 
the audit. For example, research can examine how auditors use expressed confidence 
from trusted advisors within their own firm. Additionally, future research can 
examine the effect of clients’ expressions of confidence during the auditor-client 
negotiation. Furthermore, future research can extend fraud studies such as 
Hammersley et al. (2010) by determining how auditors respond to expressions of 
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Appendix A includes Tables 1 through 5. These tables provide the analyses 
for the pilot test, demographic information, and the analyses for the main dependent 






        _______________________________________________ 
 
Table 1 
Analysis of Expressions of 
Confidence or No Confidence 
 
 
Note: The scale ranged from 1 (not confident) to 11 






Standard            
Deviation 
I’m not sure, but it may be… 2.75 1.72 
 
I could be wrong, but… 3.00 1.91 
 
I’m not certain, but it could be… 3.08 1.52 
 
 
I suppose it's… 3.66 1.44 
 
I suspect it’s… 3.95 1.99 
 
I would say it's… 4.50 1.89 
 
I believe it’s… 4.75 1.63 
 
I'm positive it's… 8.33 2.18 
 
I’m confident it’s 8.50 2.24 
 
I know for a fact it’s… 8.75 2.22 
 









Auditors’ Demographic Information 
Number of Auditorsa 68 






Experience in Public Accounting 
0 to 24 months 15% 
33 to 48 months 70% 
49 to 71 months 15% 
  
  
Interview Techniques Trainingb 
Training not completed 42% 













a Auditor demographics and assessments do not vary across treatments (p > 0.10). 
Demographic information is not provided by 18 auditors due to firm policy. 
b The instrument asked auditors whether they had participated in interviewing 
techniques training because some auditors may learn to look for cues, such as 









Audit Task Descriptive Statistics and Hypothesis Tests  
Dependent Variable: Relya 
 
Panel A: Overall ANOVA 
 
Variable 
 df F pc 
Confidenceb 1 0.12 0.73 
      
Control Environment 1 2.77 0.10 
      
Confidence × Control Environment 1 1.89  0.18 
      
Panel B: Mean (Standard Deviation) [number of participants] for Extent of 
Reliance  









Confidence Present 4.07 3.93 4.00  
(1.83) (1.58) (1.68)  
[15] [15] [30]  
 Confidence Absent 4.54 3.14 3.81  
(1.98) (1.51) (1.86)  
[13] [14] [27]  
 Column Mean 4.28 3.55  
(1.88) (1.57)  
[28] [29]  
           a Auditors judged to what extent they will rely on the client explanation 
regarding the inventory valuation. The scale ranged from 1 (will not rely at al)
to 11 (completely rely). 
 
b Auditors in the confidence present (confidence absent) condition viewed a 
client explanation with (without) and expression of confidence.  












Table 4  
Audit Task Descriptive Statistics and Hypothesis Tests 
Dependent Variable: Extenta 
 




































Panel B: Overall ANOVA 
 
Variable               df   F    p c 
 
Confidence    1  0.49  0.49 
 
Control Environment                         1  3.54  0.07 
 
Confidence × Control Environment 1  5.20             0.03* 
 
a Auditors judged the extent of testing they would perform based on the client 
explanation relative to the extent of testing they anticipated performing given
the client’s industry and size range. The scale ranged from -5 (decreased 
inventory testing) to +5 (increased inventory testing). 
b Auditors in the confidence present (confidence absent) condition viewed a 
client explanation with (without) and expression of confidence.  








Table 4  
Audit Task Descriptive Statistics and Hypothesis Tests 
Dependent Variable: Extenta 
 
Panel C: Means and ANOVA Results for Simple Main 








Absent    F   pc  
Weak Control 
Environment 1.93 (1.03) 2.93 (1.54) 4.52 
    
0.04* 
Strong Control 
Environment 2.07 (1.22) 1.54 (1.20) 1.23 0.27 
a Auditors judged the extent of testing they would perform based on the 
client explanation relative to the extent of testing they anticipated 
performing given the client’s industry and size range. The scale ranged 
from -5 (decreased inventory testing) to +5 (increased inventory testing). 
b Auditors in the confidence present (confidence absent) condition 
viewed a client explanation with (without) and expression of confidence.  








Restaurant Review Task Descriptive Statistics and Hypothesis Tests 
 
 
Confidence Presentb Confidence Absent 
 
n Mean Std. Devn. 
 
n Mean Std. Devn. 
 
t-statistic Pr>ItI 
Interesta 32 6.09 1.51 
 







32 3.91 1.67 
 
18 4.08 2.57 
 
-0.26 0.79 
a Auditors assessed three dependent variables: (1) their interest in eating at the 
restaurant (interest), (2) the extent to which they found the restaurant review 
surprising (surprising), and (3) the extent to which they found the restaurant review 
unexpected (unexpected). All scales ranged from 1 (not at all 
interested/surprising/unexpected) to 9 (extremely interested/surprising/unexpected) 
to be consistent with Karmarkar and Tormala (2010).  Each participant’s judgments 
of surprise and unexpected are averaged together to form one measure, consistent 
with Karmarkar and Tormala (2010). 
b The expressed confidence of the restaurant reviewer is varied at two levels, 








Appendix B includes Tables B1 through B3. These tables serve as a 
supplement to the tables in Appendix A. These tables show the analyses for 









Audit Task Descriptive Statistics and Analysis  
Measure: Additionala 
 









Confidence Present 3.00  3.20 3.10 
(1.51)  (2.24) (1.89) 
[15]  [15] [30] 
 
Confidence Absent 3.77  3.21 3.48 
(2.35)  (2.46) (2.37 
[13]  [14] [27] 
 
Column Mean 3.36  3.21  
(1.95) (2.30) 
[28]  [29]  
         
Panel B: Overall ANOVA 
 
Variable    df  F  pd 
 
Confidence    1  0.47  0.49 
      
Control Environment                      1  0.10  0.75 
      
Confidence × Control Environment 1  0.43  0.51 
  
a Auditors selected additional procedures they would perform  for the audit. 
The number of procedures selected was used in the analysis. Auditors could 
select between 0 and 8 procedures.  See Exhibit 2 for specific procedures. 
b Auditors in the confidence present (confidence absent) condition viewed a 
client explanation with (without) and expression of confidence. 
c Due to a glitch in the online instrument, twenty three participants were not 
able to select more than 1 procedure. In three of the four conditions, six 
participants were allowed to select only one procedure. In one of the 
conditions (strong-confidence present) five participants were allowed to 
select only one procedure. However, this biases against results. 






Table B2  
Audit Task Descriptive Statistics and Analysis  
Measure: Writedowna 
 

























 Column Mean 7.11 
 
7.83 





         
Panel B: Overall ANOVA 
 
Variable    df  F  pc 
 
Confidence     1  0.00  0.99 
      
Control Environment                         1  2.62  0.11 
      
Confidence × Control Environment  1  1.08   0.30 
 
a Auditors judged the likelihood the inventory will need to be written down. 
The scale ranged from 1 (not likely) to 11 (very likely). 
b Auditors in the confidence present (confidence absent) condition viewed a 
client explanation with (without) and expression of confidence.  









Audit Task Descriptive Statistics and Analysis  
Measure: Average of Surprising and Unexpecteda 
 
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) [number of participants] for Average of 








Confidence Present 4.70  4.73 4.72 
(1.96)  (2.21) (2.06) 
[15]  [15] [30] 
 
Confidence Absent 4.88  6.00 5.46 
(1.58)  (1.69) (1.71) 
[13]  [14] [27] 
 
Column Mean 4.79  5.34  
(1.77) (2.05) 
[28]  [29]  






Panel B: Overall ANOVA 
 
Variable             df       F          pc 
 
Confidence             1       2.08                  0.16 
      
Control Environment                                  1       1.30       0.26 
      
Confidence × Control Environment          1       1.16       0.29 
  
a Auditors assessed two dependent variables: (1) the extent to which they found the 
controller explanation surprising (surprising), and (2) the extent to which they 
found the controller explanation unexpected (unexpected). All scales ranged from 1 
(not at all surprising/unexpected) to 9 (extremely surprising/unexpected) to be 
consistent with Karmarkar and Tormala (2010).  Each participant’s judgments of 
surprise and unexpected are averaged together to form one measure, consistent with 
Karmarkar and Tormala (2010). 
b The expressed confidence of the restaurant reviewer is varied at two levels, 
confidence present and confidence absent. 







Appendix C includes figures for Hypotheses 1-3, RQ1a, and the experimental 
design. Appendix C also includes an exhibit describing the variables and measures 
from the experiment. Additionally, this appendix includes an exhibit with the 
complete instrument.  
 
 





1 and Hypothesis 2 
Confidence Heuristic 
Prediction: Auditor 
Interpretation: Cue for 
reliability 
 Presumptive Doubt View 
of Skepticism Prediction: 






*The business environment cue magnifies the tone at the top cue. It provides a cue as 
to whether incentives to meet analyst consensus forecasts are present. 
 
73 











Figure 3 – Comparison of Judgments in the Audit Task to the Non-audit Task 
(RQ1a) 










Yes Yes Auditors behave according to confidence heuristic 
predictions. 
No Yes Auditors behave according to auditing standards only when 
performing audits. 
No No Auditors behave according to their trait skepticism. 
• Trait skepticism can be learned from the auditing 
environment, and as a result, auditors apply it in 
all environments. 
• Trait skepticism may be a personality trait 

























Present 1 2 5 















Exhibit 1 – Variables and Measures 
Main Dependent Variables Scale 
To what extent will you rely on the controller 
explanation for the inventory valuation?  
1 (Will not rely at all) to 11 (Completely 
rely) 
First, consider the amount of testing over inventory 
valuation that you would have anticipated performing 
based on S&A’s industry and size range. Now, based on 
S&A’s Controller’s responses to your inquiries about the 
inventory value, would you expect to increase or 
decrease the testing of S&A Tech’s inventory account? 
By how much? 
-5 (Decreased inventory testing) to +5 
(Increased inventory testing) 
Additional questions related to Karmarkar and 
Tormala (2010) 
Scale 
How surprising did you find the client explanation? 1 (Not at all surprising) to 9 (Extremely 
surprising) 
How unexpected did you find the client explanation? 1 (Not at all unexpected) to 9 (Extremely 
unexpected) 
Additional question related to the truth bias Scale 
While engaged in an audit, I have a tendency to judge 
explanations from clients mostly as: 
                         
1(Mostly as falsehoods) to 11 (Mostly as 
truths) 
Additional question related to auditor 
interpretation of skepticism 
Scale 
Auditing Standards require auditors to be skeptical whi e 
auditing. In your daily work, how do you apply this 
skeptical mindset? 
  
1 (I interpret the auditing standards to 
require me to evaluate evidence 
objectively, with no presumptions) to 11 
(I interpret the auditing standards to 
require me to evaluate evidence with a 




Additional question related to likelihood of 
inventory write down 
Scale 
What is the likelihood that the inventory will need to be 
written-down? 
1 (Not likely) to 11(Very likely) 
Additional question related to additional audit 
procedures required for inventory valuation 
Scale 
What additional procedure(s), if any, would you choose 
to perform with regard to the inventory valuation?   
Selection of additional procedures from a 







Exhibit 2: Instrument – Audit task: Strong Control and Business Environment, 
Confidence Present Condition; Non-audit task (Restaurant Review): 
Confidence Absent Condition 
Instructions 
Thank you for participating.  
I am interested in understanding how auditors engage in and respond to 
management inquiry.  
In this study, you will be asked to act as the senior associate auditor on the S&A 
Tech Company engagement. Included is the background of the company and 
selected financial information of the company. Please read the information and 
then answer some questions regarding your thoughts on the case information.  
 
All responses will remain anonymous and confidential.  Please do not discuss your 
responses with other participants. 










Background of S&A Tech Company 
S&A Tech is a public company that sells electronic accessories for cell phones, 
computers, and other technologies. The company has been in operation for five 
years. 
 
Assume that you are assigned to the audit of S&A Tech for the fiscal year ended 
December 31, 2010. S&A purchases its inventory from manufacturers and sells to 
businesses and individuals. 
Over the past three years, S&A Tech’s financial performance and share prices have 
improved steadily, and the company has been profitable. During this time, your firm 
has audited S&A Tech. Your firm has always issued unqualified opinions for the 
financial statement audit. 






Sales $384,992,000  $371,878,000  
COGS $326,471,000  $320,800,000  
Net Income $29,200,000  $25,000,000  
Merchandise 
Inventory 
$60,115,000  $50,125,000  
Total Assets $242,130,000  $200,120,000  
 
 
The inventory turnover ratio for 2010 is 5.4. The inventory turnover ratio for 2009 is 
6.4. 
 
Your firm has set tolerable error relating to the financial statement valuation 





In discussions regarding S&A Tech, your audit team identified noteworthy 
aspects of S&A Tech’s control environment (outlined below) and made a 
preliminary determination that the control environment was strong.  
• S&A Tech distributes a code of conduct and the company discusses the code 
of conduct with employees annually.   
• The audit committee meets twice per quarter to monitor business risks and 
review company strategies and business plans. The nature and extent of this 
review is sufficient to identify material and significant matters that could 
impact financial results. 
• S&A Tech is composed of competent employees who have experience and 
knowledge in the industry.   
 
Additionally, your audit team noted the following about the business 
environment. 
• S&A Tech management does not exhibit strong concerns regarding meeting 
analysts’ consensus forecasts. Instead, they are focused on acting ethically. 
 
You have been asked to evaluate the inventory valuation, specifically the potential 
for inventory obsolescence. The inventory in question is one of S&A Tech’s 
electronic accessory product lines. The sales price for this product has been $30 per 
unit for each of the last two years.  
S&A Tech has 60,000 units of the electronic accessory in stock at year end, which is 
equivalent to six months sales. S&A Tech’s recorded cost for this inventory is $20 
per unit, or a total of $1,200,000. 
You inquire with S&A Tech’s Controller, Pat Smyth, regarding the inventory 
valuation. Pat is responsible for determining whether to write off inventory as 
obsolete. For the current audit, Pat serves as your firm’s contact person regarding 
questions about account balances. 









“I'm absolutely certain that we can move the product, so it is best to wait and see 
how this product sells in developing markets before we write the inventory off as 
obsolete. In similar situations in the past, sometimes we have been able to sell 
older products in developing countries at reduced prices and sometimes we have 
not. 
I realize this product is of concern because one of our competitors has introduced a 
technologically superior product. Our competitor is selling their new product at $24, 
which is less than our price. However, I should note that our product comes in more 
colors, and we have an established reputation in the market, so I’m absolutely 
certain that we can move the product.” 
Directions: Below are questions about the case. You are free to look back at the 
information provided on the previous pages. Please circle the number on the scale 
that corresponds to your judgment.  
 
1. To what extent will you rely on the controller explanation for the 
inventory valuation?  
 
       1            2             3              4            5             6             7             8              9          10          11 
       l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
Will not                                                                                                                                       Completely  
rely  at all                                                                                                                                             rely  
         
       
2. Please explain why you chose that level of reliance (i.e., the reason for 






3. First, consider the amount of testing over inventory valuation that you 
would have anticipated performing based on S&A’s industry and size 
range. Now, based on S&A’s Controller’s responses to your inquiries 
about the inventory value, would you expect to increase or decrease the 
testing of S&A Tech’s inventory account? By how much? Make a mark on 
the scale below to indicate your judgment.  
 
    -5             -4            -3             -2           -1            0            +1           +2            +3         +4          +5 
       l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
Decreased                                                                                                                                   Increased 
Inventory testing                                                                                         Inventory testing  
 
 
Same amount of 






4. What additional procedure(s), if any, would you choose to perform with 
regard to the inventory valuation? (Circle all that apply) 
 
a. Discuss possible obsolescence and overstock of inventory with 
operating personnel. 
b. Verify that employees are tagging obsolete items 
c. Trace for possible obsolete merchandise that is continually 
carried on the books. 
d. Examine current market data and other market conditions that 
would provide audit evidence regarding the market value of 
inventory. 
e. Review historical sales trends (quantities and prices) of the 
product during the year to determine if there are any 
deteriorating trends.  
f. Review sales of the product subsequent to year end to 
determine quantities sold and prices. Compare actual sales to 
forecasted sales.  
g. Inquire with the marketing team to verify that the product is 
marketed in an international market and to verify the prices at 
which the product is marketed.  
h. Obtain market research to verify there is an international 
market for S&A’s device of sufficient size and at prices that will 
support profitable sales of the inventory.  
i. None 




5. What is the likelihood that the inventory will need to be written-down? 
       1            2             3              4             5             6             7             8              9          10          11 
       l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
Not                                                                                                                                                       Very  






To complete my study, please provide your response to an unrelated task below. It 
will only take a few minutes, and it is completely contained on this page. Thanks in 
advance for your time.  
Below is a restaurant review by Skylar Eatsy from an online blog. Skylar Eatsy is a 
networks administrator at a nearby community college who keeps a personal blog.  
 
October 10, 2010 
Bianco – a tentative 4 out of 5 
 
I usually end up eating out at fast food places, but last night I was invited by a friend 
to go to Bianco, a mid-priced restaurant on the peninsula that just opened a few 
months ago. I really liked it. The dining room had a wonderful ambience – very 
attractive and welcoming. Their menu was great too. It featured homemade pastas, 
at least six meat-centered entrees, and several vegetarian options. The house salad 
was a refreshing start to the meal. I tried their vegetarian lasagna, and thought it 
was rich, tasty, and filling. My friend was very impressed with her pasta and roasted 
chicken. I believe that the chef has done all of the dishes on the menu as well as 
these. The service was excellent. Our waitress was charming and extremely helpful 
in answering our questions and suggesting options. At the end of the meal, the 
espresso was good and the desserts were terrific. We particularly enjoyed the 
gelato. Our final bill was roughly $25 per person and I was very satisfied. Having 
eaten there only once, I don’t have complete confidence in my opinion, but I 
suppose I would give Bianco a rating of 4 [out of 5] stars. 
 
1. How interested are you in having a meal at Bianco? 
 
       1            2             3              4            5             6             7             8             9           
       l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
             Not at all                                                                                                                     Extremely 
             interested                                                                                                                   interested 
 
2. How surprising did you find the restaurant review? 
        1            2             3              4            5             6             7              8             9       
        l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
Not at all                                                                                                                Extremely                                                                                                                                   











3. How unexpected did you find the restaurant review? 
       1            2             3              4            5             6             7             8              9           
       l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l 
Extremely 
unexpected 






Directions: Please answer the following questions about the S&A Tech audit task. 
Please circle the number on the scale that corresponds to your judgment.  
 
1. How competent did you perceive the controller to be? 
      1              2             3             4             5             6             7             8              9          10          11 
       l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
Not  at all                                                                                                                                 Extremely 
Competent                                                                                                                             Competent 
 
2. How accurate did you perceive the controller to be?  
       1            2             3              4             5             6             7             8             9          10          11 
       l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
Not at all                                                                                                                                  Extremely 
Accurate                                                                                                                                     Accurate 
 
3. How trustworthy did you perceive the controller to be?  
      1             2             3              4             5            6             7             8              9          10          11 
       l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
Not at all                                                                                                                                                   Extremely 
Trustworthy                                                                                                                                          Trustworthy 
 
4. How honest did you perceive the controller to be? 
      1             2             3              4             5            6             7             8              9          10          11 
       l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
      Not at all                                                                                                                                   Extremely 
      Honest                                                                                                                                   Honest 
 
5. How reliable did you perceive the controller to be?  
             1            2             3              4             5             6             7             8              9          10          11 
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
   Not at all                                                                                                                                    Extremely 
   Reliable                                                                                                                                   Reliable 
 
6. How deceptive did you perceive the controller to be? 
             1            2             3              4             5            6             7             8              9          10          11 
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
    Not at all                                                                                                                                      Extremely 
    Deceptive                                                                                                                    Deceptive 
 
 
7. Do you think the controller had a strong desire for you, as the auditor, to 
rely on the explanation for the inventory value asserted? 







8. Please evaluate the strength of the tone at the top using the following 
scale. 
     1             2             3              4             5            6             7             8              9          10          11 
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
          Weak                                                                   Average                                                        Strong 
 
9. Please evaluate the strength of the audit committee using the following 
scale. 
 
     1             2             3              4             5            6             7             8              9          10          11 
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
          Weak                                                                  Average                                                        Strong 
 
10. Did the company have incentives to meet analysts' consensus forecasts?       
 
_______Yes       _______No                                                                                                   
 
11. How surprising did you find the client explanation for the inventory 
valuation? 
      1             2             3              4             5             6             7             8              9          10          11 
       l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
                               
 
12. How unexpected did you find the client explanation for the inventory 
valuation? 
       1            2             3              4             5             6             7             8              9          10          11 





13. How realistic did you find the information provided in the audit case? 
       1            2             3              4             5             6             7             8              9          10          11 
       l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
Not at all           Extremely 
Realistic                                                                                                                                     Realistic 
 
14. Did the controller express confidence in his/her explanation regarding 
the inventory account? 

















15. While engaged in an audit, I have a tendency to judge explanations from 
clients mostly as: 
       1            2             3              4             5             6             7             8              9          10          11 
       l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
Mostly as                              Neutral               Mostly     
Truths                                                                                                                                                  as           
Falsehoods 
     
 
16. Auditing Standards require auditors to be skeptical while auditing. In 
your daily work, how do you apply this skeptical mindset? 
    1            2             3              4            5             6             7             8              9          10          11 
     l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  








Directions: Please answer the following questions about the restaurant review task. 
Please circle the number on the scale that corresponds to your judgment.  
 
1. How competent did you perceive the restaurant reviewer to be? 
      1            2             3              4             5             6             7             8              9          10          11 
       l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
Not at all                                                                                                                                  Extremely 
Competent                                                                                                                            Competent 
 
 
2. How accurate did you perceive the restaurant reviewer to be?  
       1            2             3              4             5             6             7             8              9          10          11 
       l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
Not at all                                                                                                                                  Extremely 
Accurate                                                                                                                                     Accurate 
 
3. How trustworthy did you perceive the restaurant reviewer to be?  
       1            2             3              4             5             6             7             8              9          10          11 
       l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
Not at all                                                                                                                                  Extremely 
Trustworthy                                                                                                                         Trustworthy 
 
I interpret the 
auditing 
standards to 









I interpret the 
auditing 
standards to 










4. How honest did you perceive the restaurant reviewer to be? 
       1            2             3              4             5             6             7             8              9          10          11 
       l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
      Not at all                                                                                                                                   Extremely 
      Honest                                                                                                                                   Honest 
 
5. How reliable did you perceive the restaurant reviewer to be?  
              1            2             3              4             5             6             7             8              9          10          11 
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
   Not at all                                                                                                                                    Extremely 
   Reliable                                                                                                                                 Reliable 
 
 
6. How deceptive did you perceive the restaurant reviewer to be?  
            1             2            3              4             5              6             7             8              9          10          11 
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l--------- l  
   Not at all                                                                                                                                      Extremely 
   Deceptive                                                                                                                               Deceptive 
 
7. Do you think the restaurant reviewer had a strong desire for you to rely 
on the restaurant review? 
      ____Yes            _____No 
 
8. Did the restaurant reviewer express confidence in the restaurant 
review? 






Directions: Statements that people use to describe themselves are given below. 
Please circle the response that indicates how you generally feel. There are no right 
or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement. 
 
1. I often accept other peoples’ explanations without further thought.  
 
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
2. I feel good about myself.   
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
3. I wait to decide on issues until I can get more information.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
4. The prospect of learning excites me.   
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
5. I am interested in what causes people to behave the way that they do.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              































6. I am confident of my abilities.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
7. I often reject statements unless I have proof that they are true.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
8. Discovering new information is fun.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
9. I take my time when making decisions.    
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
10. I tend to immediately accept what other people tell me.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
11. Other peoples’ behavior doesn’t interest me.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              

































12. I am self-assured.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
13. My friends tell me that I usually question things that I see or hear.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
14. I like to understand the reason for other peoples’ behavior.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
15. I think that learning is exciting.  
             1             2             3             4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
16. I usually accept things I see, read or hear at face value.   
             1             2             3             4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
17. I don’t feel sure of myself.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              

































18. I usually notice inconsistencies in explanations.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
19. Most often I agree with what the others in my group think.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
20. I dislike having to make decisions quickly.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
21. I have confidence in myself.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
22. I don’t like to decide until I’ve looked at all of the readily available information.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
23. I like searching for knowledge.  
              1             2             3            4             5             6              

































24. I frequently question things that I see or hear.  
             1             2             3             4             5             6              




25. It is easy for other people to convince me. 
              1             2             3            4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
26. I seldom consider why people behave in a certain way.  
             1             2             3             4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
27. I like to ensure that I’ve considered most available information before  
        making a decision. 
 
             1             2             3              4             5             6              
              l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l --------- l  
 
 
28. I enjoy trying to determine if what I read or hear is true.  
             1             2             3              4             5             6              































29. I relish learning.  
              1             2             3             4             5             6              




30. The actions people take and the reasons for those actions are fascinating. 
             1             2             3              4             5             6              

















Please answer the following questions. This information will remain confidential.   
1. Your gender (optional):  ______ Female      ______ Male 
2. Your current position in your firm (optional): 
______ Staff ______ Manager ______ Other 
______ Senior ______ Sr. Manager  (please specify): 
______ Supervisor ______ Partner ______________________ 
4. How long have you been employed at your present firm? 
 ______ years ______ months 
5. How long have you been employed in public accounting in total?  
  ______ years ______ months 
6. Please indicate your highest degree and the year completed: 
_______________________ (Degree) 
7. What professional certifications do you hold (for example, CPA)? 
_______________ 
8. Have you ever completed a course in interviewing techniques? 
___Yes    ____No 
This completes the study. Please return remaining items to envelope 2. Thank you 
very much for your participation! 
 
